Why the World’s Biggest Funds Get Mining Wrong (David Sparks)

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Do you think those are money
markets?

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Are.
More inefficient.

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More inefficient.
You know, it's interesting.

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These names always just follow
what the commodities do, and

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then you get periods where that
just stops working.

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We talk about what it takes to
make a good commodity investor

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all the time and namely you've
got to ride volatility through

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the cycle.
We know that you've got to be

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patient, but there are these big
huge institutions, multi Strat

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hedge funds, which by definition
a very short term oriented.

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And thankfully today we've got
just a guess to to tease out why

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multi Strat hedge funds or pod
shops are the worst way to

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invest in the sector.
This is a a super exciting chat

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and it's one we actually wanted
to to have for quite a while.

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I think we're going to to a
large extent try and demystify

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what is pretty foreign to a lot
of the punters around here,

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right?
So you might hear the words pod

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shop, multi Strat firm, you
know, these big hedge funds like

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Citadel, like Millennium, like
.72.

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And we're going to speak with
David Sparks and he's going to

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try and help us answer this
question and sort of share

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thoughts and share ideas around
why they have such a tough time

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investing in commodity players,
in mining companies, in natural

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resource companies because of
that vicious commodity cycle

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that a lot of the other
investors we speak with try and

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make a winning from, right?
And, and David Sparks is, yeah,

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one of the, one of the, the
wonderful few people out there

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who has worked in one of these
institutions.

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He's worked at Millennium, but
it's not the only the only one

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that like he's he's working
this, this kind of hedge fund,

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more multi Strat model, multi
manager model.

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Like several times he actually
started his career like, you

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know, working for a hedge fund
for the for the Bass family.

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Yeah, famous, famous oil family.
And these days he's, yeah, he

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works for First New York and
he's got a more kind of

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discretionary strategy that he
runs, but still investing in our

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favorite sector being and metals
and mining.

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And I think he covers some
energy too.

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That's right mate, I'm excited
to share this conversation.

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David Sparks, thank you so much
for joining Money of Mine.

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With a lot of that, you're
willing to have the

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conversation.
So peeling back the curtain on

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the mysterious multi manager
hedge fund, world pod shops,

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multi Strat funds, they've got a
variety of different names, but

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they have kind of taken over
where capital is, what's moving

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markets, where a lot of the flow
is.

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So we have to talk about it.
There's an intersection in

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metals and mining.
You've worked at multi Strat

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hedge funds.
You spent three years with

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Millennium and that wasn't your
only visit in that world, but

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you've seen the lot and you're
now obviously working prop shop

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instead with a lot more
discretion.

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What is a multi Strat hedge
fund?

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What is a pod shop?
The the rise of the multi Strat

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it has been 20 years in the
making.

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I think a lot of people know the
big names being Millennium

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Citadel in 2072 or not, but it's
a grouping of a lot of different

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types of strategies.
The idea being if we put a lot

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of smart people together that
run money differently, we can

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approach the efficient frontier
of returns and offer the best

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risk reward to our investors.
That's the idea.

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And how did you find yourself
Dave, in one of these with a

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meadows and mining lands?
Because we always hear that

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meadows and mining is a credibly
small market and you're in the

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States.
So you found your way to

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investing a bit of money in this
specific sector for a multi

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strap fund?
Yes.

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So they're always on the lookout
for talent and you know, their

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assets have been growing very
steadily for a very long time.

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I had been working for a
portfolio manager for a wealthy

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family for the first seven years
of my career.

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And then he got interest from
Millennium and they kind of made

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him an offer.
And we went over and they throw

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a bunch of money at you.
You take what you were doing

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before and you say, OK, I can do
that there.

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And then that's how that whole
thing happens.

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With the model of these multi
Strat funds is it's so different

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to what you can be used to
anywhere else right?

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Like the risk overlay, the way
that capital scales in

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accordance with performance, but
that model has enabled them to

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accrue so much funds under
management and now there's such

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a force in our markets.
But when you're going from a

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more discretionary strategy to
and then applying it in a multi

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Strat world with like how did,
how did that, how did that, how

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did that pan out?
How'd that go?

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It is not entirely different
from what you know you would do

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with a traditional longshore,
but you know, there's a lot more

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emphasis placed on risk
controls.

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I mean they have a prescriptive
formula that they try to provide

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to management teams and that
really isn't it.

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How to say this, you're kind of
fitting, you're fitting A

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desired volatility construct
into a portfolio.

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So the with the technology or
consumer or utilities, it's

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pretty easy to fit into like
what exposures you're taking,

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how do you find, how do you
define your idiosyncratic risk?

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Where it gets trickier, I think
to the point of your question

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with mining or energy or
something with commodity risk is

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how do you define what
idiosyncratic risk you're taking

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and do it in a kind of neutral
way?

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That's not going to put them at
risk, right?

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Because I mean, their whole game
is growing assets, generating

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fees off those assets.
And what they're doing is

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putting a lot of leverage on
that capital.

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So think of it, for every dollar
that they get from their

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investors, you know, you're
probably putting 3 to $4.00 long

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and three to $4.00 short into
the marketplace.

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So if you're a 10 billion fund,
you might have 30 billion long,

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30 billion short spread across a
number of teams.

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If you lose money, you know, if
if a couple of teams start

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losing money, that creates a
huge problem for that asset base

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and and the returns to the
investors.

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But the idea is like, all right,
if I have 20 smart teams and I

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can tell them all right, fit
into this risk model.

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And as long as you stay within
the this risk model, which we've

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figured out is what's going to
keep your volatility down, then

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you're smart.
You're going to have your alpha

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and we're going to be able to
generate returns with a ton of

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leverage that's going to look
amazing to our investors.

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The issue with that is the
incentive structure of the

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management team of a multi
manager.

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Then you have the incentive
structure of like the portfolio

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manager and what are they trying
to achieve and your investing

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style may not necessarily align
with wanting to fit perfectly

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into that structure.
Where as you can be much more

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risk seeking, willing to ride
out more volatility in what's

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happening with your positions
and your theses because of the

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leverage employed in the system.
Dave, can you just expand on the

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neutral component?
Yeah.

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So there are a number of factors
that these guys are looking at

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and it varies by firm, like how
intense the factor models are,

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whether it's value or growth or
momentum or just beta.

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Like some, some firms are very
focused on having you like very

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factor neutral where your longs
and shorts kind of cancel each

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other out.
So your exposure to the value

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factor would be 0 in essence.
But if you build a portfolio

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where the positions you like the
best you want to take create an

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imbalance, then they can either
tell you you need to cut the

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positions or you start forcing
in other positions that you

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don't necessarily want in your
portfolio just to hedge out some

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sort of factor risk.
And I think that's where a lot

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of people tend to get frustrated
with the system, if they are

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frustrated with the system, is
that you can spend time forcing

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positions that you don't
necessarily want in a portfolio,

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which can be often diluted to
your process, your alpha, your

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time.
That can be one of the

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significant frustrations.
The whole model, it's looking to

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reward alpha, right?
And you as a portfolio manager

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will have some insights to
express them.

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With certain longs and shorts,
maybe they get hedged out.

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But if you're roughly kind of
neutral in some respects, then

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that idiosyncratic insight
should be rewarded as alpha and

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you get remunerated accordingly.
Is that kind of a fair

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characterization?
Yeah, that's basically the idea.

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And also your comp at the end of
the year, you know there'll be a

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baseline percentages that you're
paid, but that also scales

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generally with most firms based
on how well you perform relative

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to a risk model.
So the model itself is fantastic

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for endowments and all these
sorts of big institutional

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allocators of capital because
the risk parameters are so

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tightly controlled and all these
sorts of things.

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So they can give money to it and
they're happy when the model

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works.
Sharp ratio, sharp ratio.

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But if we look at it from the
other lens of financing mining

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companies and financing assets
to get them built and get them

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off the ground, there seems to
be a bit of a disconnect because

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the duration that needs to go in
and the volatility often

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inherent in financing mining
projects is, you know, it's

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hugely volatile.
So how do you marry those up and

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you sort of sitting in between
making no way?

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You don't, I think this is it's
one of the interesting things,

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right?
It's like the multi managers are

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so large and you're so active in
the market trading that you

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generate tons of commissions
that you pay to the street,

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which means you have world class
access to management teams.

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So you end up getting to know
management teams incredibly well

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and that is one of the largest
benefits of working in a place

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like this.
However, because of the risk

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model, you are forced in largely
into being a traitor, especially

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in a space like ours which is so
volatile that you have to

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constantly be monetizing
positions.

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And if you're talking about
financing a mind and taking a

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long term view on something or
writing something out through a

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period of volatility.
I mean, I'm thinking about my

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own experience in 2015 trying to
ride out Glencore through

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everyone thinking it was going
bankrupt at the end of that

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year.
That is not viewed favorably.

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So to your question, very
difficult to marry those two

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ideas.
Management teams get amazing

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access to these investors and I
think they tend to enjoy

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conversations because, you know,
there's a lot of talent, there's

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a lot of very smart people that
work at these places, but they

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are not your typical cornerstone
long term shareholders.

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Talk me through this Glenn Core
period.

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Oh, 2015, not a positive time in
our markets.

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One or two of the trading houses
were going bankrupt.

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I think it was Noble groups that
was having issues.

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If I recall, everyone then
looked at Glencore and said, oh,

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Glencore's got a trading
business.

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Glencore is going bankrupt.
Glencore CDs was blowing out in

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the fall of 2015.
Ivan's coming to town and this

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is great part of working at
multi manager.

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You have access to Ivan, got to
sit down a couple times.

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Hey, what is your trading
business like?

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From my understanding, you move
cold from here to there and the

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duration is very short.
You should not have a financing

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problem.
That got reiterated a number of

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times.
OK, Understand this like you're

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not actually going to go
bankrupt.

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Trying to explain that when CVS
markets are telling people

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otherwise became a difficult
discussion to have.

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How do you manage that
volatility then in a 2015 is the

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ultimate kind of bear market the
commodities where everything's

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like do you get forced out of a
position early or?

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I mean, that's what happens.
You get forced out.

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You really have to shrink, you
force on bad hedges.

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Yeah, Anything that you
shouldn't do or that you

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wouldn't want to do.
We see, we see this like

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justification about volatility
in in markets these days when

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there's unexplainable
volatility, like fingers get

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pointed to a pod shop blew up.
And yeah, it kind of feels like

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an explanation just to just to
explain something away.

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But it is a real phenomenon too,
right?

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Like what?
Does that mean, Well, think of

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it as a kind of like a cascading
factor, right?

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Where there's so much money and
a Millennium might have 10 teams

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trading 1 sector and .72, I have
a couple teams that will have a

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00:14:17,440 --> 00:14:20,240
number of teams.
So you have all this capital

228
00:14:20,720 --> 00:14:24,640
flowing into a sector and
especially if the sector is

229
00:14:24,640 --> 00:14:26,680
small, you can get very crowded
positions.

230
00:14:26,720 --> 00:14:31,200
If you look at the factors to
watch on Bloomberg, if you look

231
00:14:31,200 --> 00:14:35,560
at a 10 year return profile, the
best performing factor is

232
00:14:35,840 --> 00:14:38,440
earnings momentum, which makes a
lot of sense.

233
00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:43,960
What hedge fund analysts are
trained to look for and invest

234
00:14:43,960 --> 00:14:48,160
in are positive earnings
revisions and short negative

235
00:14:48,160 --> 00:14:51,640
earnings revisions.
When you throw a lot of very

236
00:14:51,640 --> 00:14:57,160
smart people looking at the same
set of data, you're going to get

237
00:14:57,160 --> 00:15:00,600
a lot of people that come to the
same conclusion, which means

238
00:15:00,600 --> 00:15:03,920
that a lot of people are going
to get stuck in the same trades.

239
00:15:04,480 --> 00:15:11,080
And then if you have some
exogenous factor happens and

240
00:15:11,080 --> 00:15:15,520
someone needs to gross down or
someone's book of some size is

241
00:15:15,520 --> 00:15:19,680
getting hurt and now they're
getting hit by the risk

242
00:15:19,680 --> 00:15:23,720
department saying, hey, you just
triggered A drawdown limit, we'd

243
00:15:23,720 --> 00:15:26,360
like you to cut your book.
All right, Now you have an

244
00:15:26,360 --> 00:15:28,480
indiscriminate seller, like they
just have to sell.

245
00:15:29,040 --> 00:15:33,440
So someone starts selling and
there's no fundamental reason

246
00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:36,040
why you'd sell that stock, but
like, you just have to cut your

247
00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:40,320
book.
Well that may put pressure on a

248
00:15:40,320 --> 00:15:45,360
stock down 4 or 5%.
And then someone else is looking

249
00:15:45,360 --> 00:15:48,840
and says why is this position
down Now their performance is

250
00:15:48,840 --> 00:15:53,080
starting to drag and they're
thinking, Oh well I can't take

251
00:15:53,080 --> 00:15:54,680
this pain anymore, now I have to
sell.

252
00:15:55,120 --> 00:15:58,840
And that's how it kind of
becomes a self fulfilling

253
00:15:58,840 --> 00:16:01,920
prophecy until the selling stops
and it's exhausted.

254
00:16:01,920 --> 00:16:05,560
Like all the books are grossed
down or someone with a bigger

255
00:16:06,080 --> 00:16:08,400
checkbook says I'm willing to
take those out of this.

256
00:16:08,920 --> 00:16:11,720
How do you think about it now,
Dave, after having been in that

257
00:16:11,720 --> 00:16:16,440
side of the table and witnessed
how things play out in your new

258
00:16:16,440 --> 00:16:18,720
role?
Do you take a more patient lens

259
00:16:18,720 --> 00:16:22,760
and know, hey, this earnings
momentum being the the sort of

260
00:16:22,840 --> 00:16:26,120
methods you mentioned there,
like, hey, I can be a bit more

261
00:16:26,120 --> 00:16:28,160
patient.
These guys are going to slam it.

262
00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:32,480
But if I can take A2345 year
view there's real money to be

263
00:16:32,480 --> 00:16:35,680
made while the kind of
straighten or the multi Strat

264
00:16:35,720 --> 00:16:38,080
shots hate this stock for
whatever reason in the short

265
00:16:38,080 --> 00:16:40,720
term.
Yeah, I think, you know, when

266
00:16:40,800 --> 00:16:43,280
you're given freedom, you can
take advantage of that.

267
00:16:43,760 --> 00:16:47,960
I mean, like now, having
listened to Neil talk about

268
00:16:48,080 --> 00:16:53,360
Ivanhoe and listening to their
web cast last week, Ivanhoe

269
00:16:53,360 --> 00:16:55,040
seems like a very mispriced
story.

270
00:16:55,480 --> 00:16:57,840
Obviously, this is something
that's going to take a little

271
00:16:57,840 --> 00:17:03,400
time and for someone in a
different seat, right?

272
00:17:03,400 --> 00:17:08,240
Like that's still messy.
Like you don't know when, what

273
00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:11,640
the new mine plan looks like,
what next year's production is

274
00:17:11,640 --> 00:17:15,839
ultimately going to look like.
So you can't actually stay with

275
00:17:15,839 --> 00:17:19,440
comfort.
Oh, I understand how this

276
00:17:19,839 --> 00:17:21,119
earnings trajectory is going to
move.

277
00:17:21,720 --> 00:17:26,800
Whereas I'm sitting here and
saying, well, Robert Friedland

278
00:17:27,079 --> 00:17:29,440
doesn't really trade at a
discount ever.

279
00:17:30,280 --> 00:17:35,240
And he's got Western Forland's
and Zambia and Angola, like

280
00:17:35,240 --> 00:17:37,880
sitting there all waiting to get
proved out.

281
00:17:38,320 --> 00:17:43,400
You're going to fix whatever
this mine issue is, right?

282
00:17:43,760 --> 00:17:45,840
I mean, I would hope so for
their sake.

283
00:17:46,360 --> 00:17:51,720
And you can, you know, in a
world where every single mining

284
00:17:51,720 --> 00:17:54,840
company wants more copper, I'm
sure there'd be tons of people

285
00:17:54,840 --> 00:17:57,120
wanting to buy.
I even know 50% up from here.

286
00:17:57,520 --> 00:17:59,360
But Robert Freeland's not
selling.

287
00:17:59,360 --> 00:18:01,600
I even know 50% up from here.
He's probably things were a lot

288
00:18:01,600 --> 00:18:05,080
more so.
But yeah, I mean, being able to

289
00:18:05,080 --> 00:18:08,320
say this is the value
disconnects and I can sit on

290
00:18:08,320 --> 00:18:13,400
this for a bit is nice.
Now you could do that at a multi

291
00:18:13,400 --> 00:18:16,800
manager as well, right?
But like you're just keeping

292
00:18:16,800 --> 00:18:22,160
that position size a lot smaller
and it's not necessarily going

293
00:18:22,160 --> 00:18:24,160
to really move the needle for
you.

294
00:18:24,920 --> 00:18:26,320
Why is it?
Why is it smaller?

295
00:18:26,320 --> 00:18:28,920
Can you?
Can you case that out is because

296
00:18:28,920 --> 00:18:32,040
the is so long dated and it's a
gradual?

297
00:18:32,040 --> 00:18:35,720
Thing you can't determine when
it's going to work with any sort

298
00:18:35,720 --> 00:18:38,280
of confidence.
So because of that, you just

299
00:18:38,280 --> 00:18:40,600
can't size it up.
Gotcha, gotcha.

300
00:18:41,200 --> 00:18:44,280
And the whole kind of betting
and position sizing around of

301
00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:47,280
events, it can be kind of
drastic to the other side as

302
00:18:47,280 --> 00:18:49,520
well, right.
If you have some unexpected

303
00:18:50,160 --> 00:18:53,320
volatile shock to in a big size
position then that's where

304
00:18:53,320 --> 00:18:55,960
things can go pear shaped.
Thanks.

305
00:18:56,120 --> 00:18:59,000
Beginning of April and Trump's
tariff announcements.

306
00:18:59,000 --> 00:19:02,320
I mean, that was just pure gross
down behavior for two weeks.

307
00:19:02,840 --> 00:19:05,360
Yeah, yeah.
When you and I first connected

308
00:19:05,520 --> 00:19:08,760
Dave before you know we even
jumped on a call, you sent me

309
00:19:08,760 --> 00:19:11,200
this message and I said I'm
curious to learn more about the

310
00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:13,920
multi Strat like a New York
hedge fund world and a pretty

311
00:19:13,920 --> 00:19:16,280
unfamiliar from it.
And you replied and you said the

312
00:19:16,280 --> 00:19:18,720
worst way to make money in the
sector.

313
00:19:19,160 --> 00:19:21,400
And that kind of stuck with me.
It resonated for a lot of ways

314
00:19:21,400 --> 00:19:23,720
because you look around our
sector and it's created some

315
00:19:23,720 --> 00:19:25,160
phenomenal wealth for many
people.

316
00:19:25,160 --> 00:19:27,480
But the people that got rich,
they got rich by taking

317
00:19:27,480 --> 00:19:29,360
entrepreneurial risk.
They were patient, they had the

318
00:19:29,360 --> 00:19:32,160
long term outlook.
They may be back to geological

319
00:19:32,160 --> 00:19:34,440
alpha as a strategy.
Maybe they had phenomenal kind

320
00:19:34,440 --> 00:19:36,840
of like long term patient stock
picking ability.

321
00:19:36,880 --> 00:19:40,440
But the common theme amongst it
all is you had to stick with it

322
00:19:40,440 --> 00:19:43,200
through the volatility and
definitionally like a multi

323
00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:46,400
Strat hedge fund can't do that.
Yeah.

324
00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:51,720
I think the other piece of that
is concentration, right?

325
00:19:51,720 --> 00:19:52,320
Like.
Yeah.

326
00:19:52,880 --> 00:19:57,440
You make money by betting on
something in a major way.

327
00:19:57,880 --> 00:19:59,360
You make money at a multi
manager too.

328
00:19:59,440 --> 00:20:01,720
I'm not discounting the wealth
generation there, but if we're

329
00:20:01,720 --> 00:20:04,320
talking wealth, you.
Shouldn't you can be a

330
00:20:04,400 --> 00:20:06,600
millionaire at a multi chart
hedge fund, but you're not going

331
00:20:06,600 --> 00:20:09,160
to be a billionaire like what
some mining entrepreneurs can

332
00:20:09,160 --> 00:20:11,320
be?
Yes, yeah.

333
00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:13,080
I mean, if there is a
difference, and I think it's a

334
00:20:13,080 --> 00:20:17,880
difference in your personality,
make up your style of who you

335
00:20:17,880 --> 00:20:20,160
are and how you think and what
you want.

336
00:20:20,640 --> 00:20:23,240
You know, there are a lot of
merits to it.

337
00:20:23,240 --> 00:20:26,920
But again, if you want to swing
and that's your personality

338
00:20:26,920 --> 00:20:30,480
type, then you can't fit a
square peg into a rental.

339
00:20:30,960 --> 00:20:35,040
What are the other parts of the
strategy which may be like

340
00:20:35,240 --> 00:20:38,520
useful or applicable to other
sectors, but there are inherent

341
00:20:38,520 --> 00:20:40,120
limitations when you look at it
with them.

342
00:20:40,200 --> 00:20:41,800
You know, the mining or
commodity lens.

343
00:20:42,760 --> 00:20:45,960
Yeah.
So I think you know, when you go

344
00:20:45,960 --> 00:20:51,480
back to why these have been so
successful, you go back to the

345
00:20:51,480 --> 00:20:55,280
early 2000s when these sorts of
funds were really getting

346
00:20:55,280 --> 00:20:59,760
started, it was you actually had
a lot of money getting made in

347
00:20:59,760 --> 00:21:02,720
utilities.
So I mean, think about the

348
00:21:02,720 --> 00:21:05,480
market is really just every
single day, who are you

349
00:21:05,480 --> 00:21:09,560
arbitraging, right?
Like where is the information

350
00:21:09,560 --> 00:21:11,520
asymmetry and what are you
taking advantage of?

351
00:21:12,480 --> 00:21:17,520
And you go back to like early
2000s with utility hedge funds

352
00:21:18,000 --> 00:21:24,400
and they were arbitrage in like
long only money that wanted a

353
00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:29,760
dividend and really wasn't doing
a lot of work on what was going

354
00:21:29,760 --> 00:21:33,240
on with those companies.
Then you throw a bunch of like

355
00:21:33,800 --> 00:21:38,440
really smart hedge fund people
with a lot of time looking at

356
00:21:38,680 --> 00:21:43,480
fuel clauses and how CapEx was
going to change rate base and

357
00:21:44,040 --> 00:21:47,640
change earnings trajectories of
utility companies, which seems

358
00:21:47,640 --> 00:21:52,560
like, you know, very nuanced,
but it made a huge difference.

359
00:21:52,560 --> 00:21:57,080
And you would have these gaps on
earnings days where people went,

360
00:21:57,080 --> 00:21:58,960
oh man, I didn't realize that
was going to happen.

361
00:21:59,440 --> 00:22:07,760
So that's where you had true
information asymmetry and where

362
00:22:07,760 --> 00:22:11,000
you saw a lot of alpha
generation and why this became

363
00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:16,080
so attractive these days, right?
Like you're who you're

364
00:22:16,080 --> 00:22:18,240
arbitraging has entirely
changed.

365
00:22:18,920 --> 00:22:23,920
You know, it, it's not the long
only is really anymore like so

366
00:22:23,920 --> 00:22:28,640
much money has moved to the
multi managers that you're kind

367
00:22:28,640 --> 00:22:33,160
of arbitraging each other and
it's what what did you hear?

368
00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:36,480
Like what data point just took
came out from that conference.

369
00:22:36,760 --> 00:22:39,160
The management team said what
and and now I need to

370
00:22:39,880 --> 00:22:42,280
reconfigure what I was thinking
for this quarter.

371
00:22:42,280 --> 00:22:45,760
And you know, if if you talk to
a management team, a, a

372
00:22:45,760 --> 00:22:49,320
complaint that they would have
when they talk to some of these

373
00:22:50,360 --> 00:22:54,880
pod shop analysts and in
meetings is the questions, you

374
00:22:54,880 --> 00:22:58,240
know, sometimes revolve around
like what's going on with your

375
00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:00,280
business.
But it's more like, how's this

376
00:23:00,280 --> 00:23:02,440
quarter looking?
Like what's in my model?

377
00:23:02,440 --> 00:23:06,000
Like how do I fix this?
And that's where the arbitrage

378
00:23:06,040 --> 00:23:08,480
has kind of moved to which it's
just different.

379
00:23:09,240 --> 00:23:11,960
And you invested globally,
right, Dave?

380
00:23:12,920 --> 00:23:16,280
Yeah, that was exhausting.
Did you notice this phenomenon

381
00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:19,480
was much more pronounced in the
States than it was perhaps in

382
00:23:19,480 --> 00:23:22,280
other markets?
Or by this point, is it pretty

383
00:23:22,520 --> 00:23:27,600
equally sane everywhere?
Every market's different. the US

384
00:23:27,600 --> 00:23:29,960
is different from Europe is
different from Australia.

385
00:23:30,400 --> 00:23:34,760
Australia always felt like you
really needed to be there to

386
00:23:34,760 --> 00:23:38,360
know what people were getting
excited about.

387
00:23:38,640 --> 00:23:41,520
There would be days where I
would not understand why

388
00:23:41,520 --> 00:23:43,960
Fortescue was moving the way it
was, and it was just like, wow,

389
00:23:44,240 --> 00:23:46,200
everyone's really excited about
iron ore right now.

390
00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:50,680
But yeah, I think still, every
geography is kind of its own

391
00:23:51,040 --> 00:23:53,240
animal.
I want to talk about the the

392
00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:56,000
shorting component as well,
because we've we've talking

393
00:23:56,000 --> 00:23:59,120
about the difficulties in, in
staying long and being long and

394
00:23:59,120 --> 00:24:01,480
sizing that.
But shorting is this kind of

395
00:24:01,640 --> 00:24:04,680
dark art and it's.
Yeah, I think it's kind of

396
00:24:05,080 --> 00:24:08,560
simplified a bit.
Yeah, I think the nuances and

397
00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:11,480
just how difficult it is, is a
bit underappreciated.

398
00:24:11,480 --> 00:24:15,080
Can you sort of give a bit of
color on just how difficult it

399
00:24:15,080 --> 00:24:18,840
is to sort of stay short, the
various costs you have to pay to

400
00:24:19,160 --> 00:24:22,840
just have a position on short
and what the difficulty it is in

401
00:24:23,400 --> 00:24:24,960
staying on that side of the
trade?

402
00:24:25,920 --> 00:24:29,800
Yeah, I think it depends what
you're shorting.

403
00:24:30,360 --> 00:24:34,200
If you're shorting something
where everyone else is short,

404
00:24:34,560 --> 00:24:40,280
that's where the cost and the
risk is like shorting lithium

405
00:24:40,280 --> 00:24:42,800
stocks.
Now, if you have a bunch of

406
00:24:42,800 --> 00:24:45,840
people short, you tend to pay
more in borrow rate, which means

407
00:24:46,240 --> 00:24:49,880
you are paying to think that
it's going to go down.

408
00:24:50,280 --> 00:24:53,080
And that's where that can kind
of create a problem.

409
00:24:53,920 --> 00:24:57,400
And that's kind of where your
your cost is.

410
00:24:57,680 --> 00:25:02,880
The painful side of that is you
may be looking at Albemarle and

411
00:25:02,880 --> 00:25:07,040
say like Albemarle has no cash
flow right now and everyone is

412
00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:10,720
at this fast markets conference
falling over themselves to say

413
00:25:10,960 --> 00:25:13,040
lithium's oversupplied until
2030.

414
00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:18,080
No, it's 2033, you know, like
and lo and behold, Albemarle is

415
00:25:18,080 --> 00:25:22,520
up 7 1/2% at one point today and
it's gone up 15% in like 4 days.

416
00:25:22,920 --> 00:25:27,920
So that is a function of the
fact that probably a lot of

417
00:25:27,920 --> 00:25:31,000
people are short.
You can't take the pain because

418
00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:34,920
you start losing money and now
you're like worried about that

419
00:25:34,920 --> 00:25:37,720
drawdown limit and having your
capital cut.

420
00:25:37,720 --> 00:25:41,920
So one person starts to buy and
cover their position and then

421
00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:44,080
that becomes reinforcing and you
get the short spans.

422
00:25:44,680 --> 00:25:47,880
So that's kind of where you have
your cost is you have that risk

423
00:25:48,440 --> 00:25:50,800
of a short squeeze on a crowded
name.

424
00:25:50,880 --> 00:25:54,840
And if it is a crowded name, you
can tend to have to pay for the

425
00:25:54,840 --> 00:25:58,280
right to borrow it.
But otherwise, I mean, if you

426
00:25:58,280 --> 00:26:02,520
want a short BHP, it's not going
to cost you anything.

427
00:26:03,320 --> 00:26:05,720
It's not going to hurt you, It's
not really going to move like

428
00:26:06,120 --> 00:26:07,800
that.
That tends to be a very like

429
00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:11,960
dummy type placeholder short
that people would use.

430
00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:15,800
When you you're borrowing shit,
it's too short.

431
00:26:16,320 --> 00:26:18,680
Sometimes the party that you
borrowed them from can demand

432
00:26:18,680 --> 00:26:21,280
them back as well.
Right, they can pull them.

433
00:26:21,360 --> 00:26:22,320
Back.
They can pull them back.

434
00:26:22,800 --> 00:26:26,120
Yeah, that's, that's a, that's a
dynamic that I didn't understand

435
00:26:26,280 --> 00:26:27,840
until recently.
Yeah.

436
00:26:27,840 --> 00:26:31,080
So I mean that you can have
shenanigans like that if you're

437
00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:35,000
trying to be cute and short
something with $500 million

438
00:26:35,000 --> 00:26:37,920
market cap.
Yeah, well, someone decides to

439
00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:42,160
pull the borrow on a small
company that can have a very

440
00:26:42,160 --> 00:26:46,000
meaningful impact.
Shorting something that is small

441
00:26:46,120 --> 00:26:48,560
tends to not be the best idea in
the world.

442
00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:52,400
I'm curious to tease out, so how
do you get, how do you get like

443
00:26:52,600 --> 00:26:56,200
you know for every dollar
invested like 4-4 dollars long

444
00:26:56,200 --> 00:26:57,840
and $4.00 short, like how does
that work?

445
00:26:58,280 --> 00:27:01,840
That's set up with prime
brokers, so they'll let them

446
00:27:02,160 --> 00:27:07,120
borrow against that and up
against your asset base, and

447
00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:13,720
they're working under the
assumption that because the lack

448
00:27:13,720 --> 00:27:18,880
of risk that they're taking,
they're very comfortable lending

449
00:27:18,880 --> 00:27:22,400
out a lot of money.
Lack of risk, it's a funny word,

450
00:27:22,400 --> 00:27:24,480
right?
There's like this, this I guess

451
00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:26,720
inherent assumption that yeah,
like a lot of these different

452
00:27:26,720 --> 00:27:29,520
risks are being hedged out and
all of the the various pods are

453
00:27:29,520 --> 00:27:34,320
all in, in independent views.
There's not the the like, yes,

454
00:27:34,360 --> 00:27:37,120
the, the it's diversified
portfolio risk as opposed to

455
00:27:37,440 --> 00:27:40,360
magnified and amplified.
But do you also think that

456
00:27:40,360 --> 00:27:44,280
there's like a big cascade kind
of risk that that can enhance a

457
00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:46,960
lot of market volatility as a
result of?

458
00:27:47,000 --> 00:27:48,720
I mean a huge hidden risk,
right?

459
00:27:48,720 --> 00:27:53,560
I think the mobile T managers
had a huge issue during the

460
00:27:53,560 --> 00:27:57,160
COVID.
I think March 2020 was very

461
00:27:57,160 --> 00:28:00,600
scary for a lot of funds.
You had a lot of PMS losing

462
00:28:00,600 --> 00:28:03,560
money.
You're looking at returns doing

463
00:28:04,480 --> 00:28:07,080
negative and wondering if you're
levered.

464
00:28:07,200 --> 00:28:11,400
How are we paying this back?
Given the amount of leverage in

465
00:28:11,400 --> 00:28:16,040
the system, there's an inherent
risk that's sitting there every

466
00:28:16,040 --> 00:28:18,840
single day.
You spoke as well before about

467
00:28:18,840 --> 00:28:22,120
having potentially a number of
teams or number of pods looking

468
00:28:22,120 --> 00:28:24,880
at certain sectors.
How did you always feel sitting

469
00:28:24,880 --> 00:28:26,960
within a metals and mining kind
of team?

470
00:28:26,960 --> 00:28:30,080
Within a bigger shop?
I'm sure tech would have had way

471
00:28:30,080 --> 00:28:31,760
more pods kind of allocated to
it.

472
00:28:32,200 --> 00:28:35,040
How much attention was paid to
the metals and mining space in

473
00:28:35,040 --> 00:28:39,320
these New York fans?
You get some.

474
00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:43,160
I mean, look, it's niche.
There generally is not a ton of

475
00:28:43,160 --> 00:28:44,920
interest for people looking for
mining.

476
00:28:45,760 --> 00:28:51,320
And I think it's also changed a
bit in that the space is not

477
00:28:51,320 --> 00:28:56,880
nearly as liquid as it used to
be, which makes it a lot harder

478
00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:59,760
because they have vast amounts
of capital, right?

479
00:29:00,040 --> 00:29:02,240
And they want you to put it to
work.

480
00:29:02,560 --> 00:29:05,360
If you're not comfortable
because of a lack of liquidity

481
00:29:05,720 --> 00:29:12,040
to have a $30 million position
on and something, then you're

482
00:29:12,040 --> 00:29:15,640
kind of constrained.
So that's kind of the governing

483
00:29:15,640 --> 00:29:18,200
factor.
I guess what is the market cap

484
00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:21,680
of your space relative to the
overall market?

485
00:29:21,960 --> 00:29:25,880
That tends to be how teams are
constructed.

486
00:29:26,200 --> 00:29:29,400
You're obviously going to have
way more tech than you will

487
00:29:29,400 --> 00:29:33,040
mining or energy, but there was
a problem years ago where you

488
00:29:33,040 --> 00:29:37,040
were over represented in some of
the smaller sectors like energy

489
00:29:37,320 --> 00:29:40,960
and you had many more teams than
you should have had for the

490
00:29:40,960 --> 00:29:45,880
market cap, which then created
that phenomenon of increased

491
00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:50,240
crowding and greater risk from
everyone being on the same side

492
00:29:50,240 --> 00:29:52,520
of a trade.
The beauty is you get to meet

493
00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:54,360
with management teams, you get
access.

494
00:29:54,560 --> 00:30:00,080
However, when you are at one of
these bigger places, you often

495
00:30:00,080 --> 00:30:05,200
have to share meetings.
So that can be fine.

496
00:30:05,440 --> 00:30:08,760
But if you're trying to work on
a thesis and flush something out

497
00:30:08,760 --> 00:30:12,560
with a management team, you
don't necessarily want to share

498
00:30:12,560 --> 00:30:17,240
the meeting because maybe you're
educating someone who's a

499
00:30:17,240 --> 00:30:19,640
competitor.
Ultimately, even though you work

500
00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:24,600
at the same fund and you know
you're trying to create this

501
00:30:24,600 --> 00:30:28,680
alpha in your head is like, OK,
I think this is an idea and I

502
00:30:28,680 --> 00:30:31,760
want to work towards something.
And then someone is getting a

503
00:30:31,760 --> 00:30:33,320
free ride on what you're working
on.

504
00:30:33,640 --> 00:30:36,600
And that can create a bit of an
issue where people get

505
00:30:36,600 --> 00:30:39,280
competitive with who gets
meeting spaces.

506
00:30:40,320 --> 00:30:43,040
The access to management is an
interesting part, right?

507
00:30:43,040 --> 00:30:48,960
Like remarkable access to the
CTS of these mining companies.

508
00:30:48,960 --> 00:30:51,200
But isn't it kind of like it's
an odd thing because you're a

509
00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:53,720
hedge fund, you know, like
you're going to buy one week,

510
00:30:53,720 --> 00:30:55,760
sell the next week.
Why is Millennium afforded such

511
00:30:55,760 --> 00:30:59,520
phenomenal management proximity
when they don't care about

512
00:30:59,520 --> 00:31:02,600
holding the stock for too long?
It's just how much you pay.

513
00:31:03,080 --> 00:31:07,160
It's the sell side that is
orchestrating all the access.

514
00:31:07,360 --> 00:31:08,120
Yeah, and you pay.
Fees.

515
00:31:08,160 --> 00:31:10,000
You're the one paying them all
the money.

516
00:31:10,600 --> 00:31:13,200
Makes sense?
Who are the management teams

517
00:31:13,200 --> 00:31:16,480
from your time working there
that really left a impression.

518
00:31:16,880 --> 00:31:18,880
There are a few names that were
running some of these big

519
00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:21,240
companies that you were kind of
wowed by.

520
00:31:22,400 --> 00:31:27,000
On like mining management teams
that I got access to.

521
00:31:27,520 --> 00:31:30,640
Ivan was very impressive.
The whole Glencore team was was

522
00:31:30,640 --> 00:31:33,040
great.
Mark, Bonnie was was very

523
00:31:33,040 --> 00:31:37,040
impressive.
Obviously the koala just wrote

524
00:31:37,040 --> 00:31:39,880
something about what he thinks
might happen there.

525
00:31:40,080 --> 00:31:42,200
So that'll be interesting to see
if that plays out, yeah.

526
00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:47,040
I reckon low probability on that
one, but yeah, maybe the koala.

527
00:31:47,040 --> 00:31:50,040
Knows.
Yeah, well, Rio's such a mess at

528
00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:52,280
the moment, as you know.
Like that would be quite the

529
00:31:52,280 --> 00:31:56,520
turn of events.
Yeah, but that was top of my

530
00:31:56,520 --> 00:31:58,040
head.
Those would be the names that I

531
00:31:58,080 --> 00:31:59,760
went with.
Yeah.

532
00:32:00,480 --> 00:32:04,760
If you had no constraints on
like investing in the sector,

533
00:32:04,920 --> 00:32:08,280
let's say you had $100 million
of Personal Capital, how would

534
00:32:08,280 --> 00:32:10,920
you deploy your own Personal
Capital without any

535
00:32:10,920 --> 00:32:13,760
institutional constraints?
How would your strategies be

536
00:32:13,760 --> 00:32:16,720
different from?
What I'm doing right now?

537
00:32:16,720 --> 00:32:23,600
Not different at all really.
It's kind of blending a medium

538
00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:30,360
term thought process and
monetizing as necessary on the

539
00:32:30,360 --> 00:32:33,200
trades.
I mean, I've been in first

540
00:32:33,200 --> 00:32:38,480
Quantum since March of last year
and thinking that Panama has to

541
00:32:38,480 --> 00:32:40,840
come to the table.
It's coming back, coming back.

542
00:32:41,760 --> 00:32:45,800
Yeah, well, Chiquita just left
Panama, so that might become I

543
00:32:46,600 --> 00:32:50,120
traded in and out of that a ton.
I think when you can blend it,

544
00:32:50,240 --> 00:32:53,800
but this is my style.
But when I'm able to blend a

545
00:32:54,240 --> 00:32:59,040
longer term thesis with short
term monetization and and not

546
00:32:59,040 --> 00:33:03,800
have to worry about, oh, my
copper length is is too long

547
00:33:03,800 --> 00:33:05,360
here.
Well, that's the risk that I

548
00:33:05,360 --> 00:33:06,160
want.
That's fine.

549
00:33:06,440 --> 00:33:08,560
You know, if I want to hedge out
copper, I'll short a copper

550
00:33:08,560 --> 00:33:12,800
contracts, which you may not be
able to do at a multi manager.

551
00:33:12,800 --> 00:33:15,840
Maybe you have to, you know,
force a copper like company

552
00:33:15,840 --> 00:33:20,000
short and you know, all the
copper companies are cheap then

553
00:33:20,000 --> 00:33:21,680
like that's not what you want to
do.

554
00:33:22,120 --> 00:33:28,960
So yeah, it's really just having
the flexibility to take the

555
00:33:29,040 --> 00:33:33,160
actual risks that you want and
not forcing risks that you don't

556
00:33:33,160 --> 00:33:34,760
want.
You mentioned a change in

557
00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:37,440
liquidity over time.
How else have you seen markets

558
00:33:37,440 --> 00:33:39,640
change over your time
participating?

559
00:33:40,120 --> 00:33:43,160
The crowdedness aspect has
entirely changed.

560
00:33:43,200 --> 00:33:49,760
I mean, when I entered the
business in 2007, that was not

561
00:33:49,760 --> 00:33:51,480
really something that you even
thought about.

562
00:33:51,760 --> 00:33:58,040
I would say really 20/13/2014 is
kind of the first time that we

563
00:33:58,040 --> 00:34:01,960
really started to notice, Hey,
you're getting like these weird

564
00:34:02,640 --> 00:34:07,360
gross down events where I don't
know why this is happening, but

565
00:34:08,239 --> 00:34:11,679
positions that you like, I like,
I mean, we all like those like,

566
00:34:11,679 --> 00:34:14,800
why is this happening?
And like so that, that I, I

567
00:34:14,800 --> 00:34:18,920
think is, has been one of the
biggest changes.

568
00:34:19,280 --> 00:34:24,280
And that's just been a result of
where the capital has gone and

569
00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:27,120
the different makeup of the
investor base trading in the

570
00:34:27,120 --> 00:34:31,480
stocks in our world where things
are not as liquid as they used

571
00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:35,600
to be 10 years ago.
You throw in the fact that even

572
00:34:35,600 --> 00:34:39,639
more smart people are looking at
the same ideas that creates

573
00:34:39,639 --> 00:34:42,760
dislocations.
Do you think those and mining

574
00:34:42,760 --> 00:34:47,520
markets are substantially more
inefficient than other markets?

575
00:34:48,520 --> 00:34:53,800
More inefficient, yeah.
You know what's interesting is

576
00:34:53,800 --> 00:35:01,800
that on a very simplistic basis,
these names always like for most

577
00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:06,160
of a period of time, will always
just follow what the commodities

578
00:35:06,160 --> 00:35:08,800
doing.
There's very little, unless

579
00:35:08,800 --> 00:35:11,680
you're talking about a developer
where you're actually getting

580
00:35:11,680 --> 00:35:16,040
NAV accretion in it.
Most of these things just follow

581
00:35:17,120 --> 00:35:22,400
what they should be following
and then you get periods where

582
00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:26,320
that just stops working and you
look at this and think, well

583
00:35:26,320 --> 00:35:31,000
this is going to correct itself.
Like if a copper company hasn't

584
00:35:31,000 --> 00:35:35,120
done it, nothing bad has
happened and it is dislocated

585
00:35:35,120 --> 00:35:38,240
from what has happened with the
copper price times it's

586
00:35:38,240 --> 00:35:41,880
projected production.
Why is this happened?

587
00:35:42,440 --> 00:35:48,280
And yeah, you get periods where
the market just misses things

588
00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:52,000
more, overreacts to things.
I think about gold fields last

589
00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:55,360
year with Solaris Norte and
their pipes rose in Chile, the

590
00:35:55,360 --> 00:35:59,080
stock was down like 15%, like 3
billion or something like that

591
00:35:59,080 --> 00:36:02,760
got taken off the market cap on
something that was going to be a

592
00:36:02,760 --> 00:36:05,480
handful of months delay.
Yeah.

593
00:36:05,480 --> 00:36:09,000
And you know, based on what they
told you, like, OK, you lost a

594
00:36:09,000 --> 00:36:12,560
couple months, you got to lose a
couple $100 million in gold

595
00:36:12,560 --> 00:36:16,040
sales.
Well, the market just took you

596
00:36:16,040 --> 00:36:20,440
down like $2 billion.
Clearly we overreacted here.

597
00:36:20,440 --> 00:36:22,960
Like what, what are we doing?
And, you know, within two weeks,

598
00:36:23,360 --> 00:36:28,080
stocks right back up 15%.
So you tend to get periods where

599
00:36:29,200 --> 00:36:32,920
you get a lot of overreactions
And, and it's it's really is

600
00:36:32,920 --> 00:36:34,840
this going to happen?
You know, is it going to correct

601
00:36:34,840 --> 00:36:38,080
tomorrow?
Or in the case of Ivan, is this

602
00:36:38,080 --> 00:36:40,160
going to take a couple months?
You just don't know.

603
00:36:40,200 --> 00:36:43,680
I can't let you go Dave, without
asking you about maybe some of

604
00:36:43,680 --> 00:36:46,880
your more recent views you've
been fleshing out lately.

605
00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:50,120
I spoke to you on the phone
maybe like 3 weeks ago and Tommy

606
00:36:50,480 --> 00:36:53,120
Sigma was looking pretty cheap
where it was and then within a

607
00:36:53,120 --> 00:36:56,120
week it had popped 20%.
So I really just.

608
00:36:57,200 --> 00:37:00,360
Need a tip.
The yeah, I mean first Quantum's

609
00:37:00,360 --> 00:37:02,040
working a little too well at the
moment.

610
00:37:02,080 --> 00:37:04,800
Sigma, I still think is
interesting in how you structure

611
00:37:04,800 --> 00:37:11,720
the trade as what I was trying
to do was sell a long dated put

612
00:37:11,880 --> 00:37:15,360
at $3, which was going to give
me the right to buy it at like

613
00:37:15,480 --> 00:37:19,080
260 a share, which is
essentially going to be you're

614
00:37:19,080 --> 00:37:21,160
going to be buying it at 580
spot.

615
00:37:21,960 --> 00:37:25,520
And then taking the proceeds
from selling those puts to buy

616
00:37:25,520 --> 00:37:32,720
calls at 10 thinking all right,
if you go back to some sort of

617
00:37:32,720 --> 00:37:37,240
cost curve at 800, so it goes
back to the 12.

618
00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:40,200
So that to me was like an
interesting way to just think

619
00:37:40,200 --> 00:37:45,240
about how you could maybe
structure a bullish lithium that

620
00:37:45,480 --> 00:37:48,640
even though I'm not bullish on
lithium.

621
00:37:49,680 --> 00:37:52,520
The name that I think is most
interesting right now, which

622
00:37:53,240 --> 00:37:57,200
honestly I hope is kind of pay
off before this podcast gets

623
00:37:57,200 --> 00:38:02,200
released, is Ramaco, which is a
little met coal producer in West

624
00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:04,480
Virginia.
But they're sitting on this rare

625
00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:10,240
earth project in Wyoming, which
is in carbon or it's not in Hard

626
00:38:10,240 --> 00:38:11,760
Rock.
They think it's a lot easier to

627
00:38:11,760 --> 00:38:15,040
process.
They are waiting to release a

628
00:38:15,040 --> 00:38:18,440
report from floor.
It was a pretty good indication

629
00:38:18,440 --> 00:38:21,720
that the guy who was running
critical minerals for Floor

630
00:38:22,160 --> 00:38:26,360
resigned and joined Ramako to
run this project, so I'm

631
00:38:26,440 --> 00:38:28,920
assuming that the economics of
the project are pretty good.

632
00:38:29,160 --> 00:38:33,680
He also left Australia to move
to Wyoming to do that.

633
00:38:34,880 --> 00:38:38,800
Based on the resource base that
we are put out for the project

634
00:38:39,080 --> 00:38:45,760
is you, you're pretty equivalent
on size as MP now.

635
00:38:46,400 --> 00:38:50,040
I did really enjoy the rare
earth pod you guys did and talk

636
00:38:50,040 --> 00:38:51,840
about the trouble with the
processing and what not.

637
00:38:52,400 --> 00:38:55,560
You are paying a very small
amount.

638
00:38:55,600 --> 00:38:59,680
I mean the market cap for this
company's gone from 500 when I

639
00:38:59,680 --> 00:39:04,520
got into it was probably like
650 now on an equivalent basis

640
00:39:04,520 --> 00:39:08,760
to MP right now because M PS
valuation is absolutely absurd.

641
00:39:09,200 --> 00:39:13,000
This project is worth like $80 a
share on a $12.00 stock.

642
00:39:13,640 --> 00:39:16,040
The base coal business is worth
like 9 at the moment.

643
00:39:16,320 --> 00:39:19,600
Highly asymmetric.
It may not work at all, maybe a

644
00:39:19,600 --> 00:39:22,880
total dud, but they are going to
be releasing that report.

645
00:39:23,240 --> 00:39:25,840
They're doing a ribbon cutting
ceremony in a couple weeks with

646
00:39:25,840 --> 00:39:29,320
a bunch of federal officials. 2
months ago now, Joe Manchin, who

647
00:39:29,320 --> 00:39:31,520
was AUS senator, joined the
board of the company.

648
00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:34,600
But it's an interesting idea.
I don't know that's going to

649
00:39:34,600 --> 00:39:37,680
work, but.
The only person that's pitched

650
00:39:37,680 --> 00:39:40,840
away, I'm in cold stock as a as
a rare ass like asymmetric

651
00:39:40,840 --> 00:39:42,520
trade.
But it's kind of funny because

652
00:39:43,400 --> 00:39:46,040
these cold guys must get like
rare FOIMO, like they want a

653
00:39:46,040 --> 00:39:50,040
sexy commodity because like
Whitehaven was a top 20

654
00:39:50,040 --> 00:39:52,960
shareholder in Brazilian rare
earths IPO.

655
00:39:53,680 --> 00:39:55,760
Yeah, I don't know.
These cold guys just want to be

656
00:39:56,120 --> 00:39:57,960
relevant and important to the
politicians.

657
00:39:59,280 --> 00:40:00,760
You know, they got to do
something.

658
00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:05,640
Yeah, hopefully it works.
Dave, this has been been

659
00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:09,400
fascinating and super insightful
into a world we don't understand

660
00:40:09,400 --> 00:40:11,560
too much about, so thank you for
sharing your time with us.

661
00:40:12,560 --> 00:40:13,760
Yeah, of course, that was
helpful.

662
00:40:13,960 --> 00:40:15,560
Thanks so much mate.
Awesome.

663
00:40:15,640 --> 00:40:17,520
How good was that mate?
I was stoked to share that

664
00:40:17,520 --> 00:40:20,440
conversation and thanks again to
Dave Sparks for joining us.

665
00:40:20,480 --> 00:40:23,680
A massive thank you also to
Inter Mining Services, Rounded

666
00:40:23,680 --> 00:40:25,280
standard ground support and
Cross boundary.

667
00:40:25,280 --> 00:40:29,720
Energy hoodoo hoodoo.
Now remember, I'm an idiot.

668
00:40:30,000 --> 00:40:31,640
JD is an idiot.
If you thought.

669
00:40:31,720 --> 00:40:33,880
Any of this was anything other
than entertainment.

670
00:40:34,360 --> 00:40:36,520
You're an idiot and you need to
read out a disclaimer.