March 25, 2025

The 5 Most Destructive Deals in Mining History

Today’s show is a bit different. We thought we’d give ourselves a history lesson and explore the costliest M&A mistakes in our industry.


Our aim was to understand what went wrong, why things went south and what mining companies and investors alike can learn so that we allocate capital better going forward.


Sign-up for the Director’s Special


Please read our Privacy Policy and Disclaimer here


Discounted tickets available for AUSIMM Underground Operators conference exclusively via Money of Mine. Get $100 off using the code MOM100.


Adelaide, 7 - 9 April 2025 (Matty will be there in full conference mode)


Discounted tickets available for Global Resources Innovation Expo (GRX) exclusively via Money of Mine. 


Austmine and AusIMM Members enter code MOM at checkout for $190 off your registration.


Non-members enter code MOMNM at checkout for $160 off your registration.


 Brisbane, 20 - 22 May, 2025


Thank you to our Partners:


Mineral Mining Services – Your preferred mining contractor


https://www.mineralminingservices.com.au/join-us/ - 1300 546 117


Grounded - Infrastructure for remote mining and civil projects Australia wide


Paul Natoli - pn@groundedgroup.com.au


Sandvik Ground Support – The only ground support you’ll ever need


http://www.rocktechnology.sandvik/groundsupport


CRE Insurance – Insurance Brokers for the Construction, Resources and Energy sectors


davidh@creinsurance.com.au - +61 2 9493 6100


K-Drill – Safe, reliable, and productive surface RC drilling


drew@k-drill.com.au - +61 416 015 876


WA Water Bores – WA’s premier water well drilling company

 

James@wawaterbores.com.au - +61 429 695 538

 

Swick - Seventeen million metres drilled. Twenty-plus global sites. Ninety rigs. 


rob.burnett@swickmining.com - +61 8 6253 2310

 

Quattro Project Engineering - Global Engineering partnerships delivered with efficiency, innovation and energy

 

info@quattrope.com - +61 8 9373 1140

 

Cross Boundary Energy – Independent Power Producer for the global mining industry

 

tim.taylor@crossboundary.com - +61 466 184 943  


Money of Mine on YouTube, Twitter, LinkedIn & Instagram


(0:00:00)Intro


(0:01:53)What's the criteria?


(0:04:08)How were the deals ranked


(0:05:47)Deal 5: An Island Adventure


(0:18:55)Deal 4: Wanna be a Copper Champ


(0:35:16)Deal 3: Don't Worry, We've Done the DD


(0:50:35)Deal 2: In a Land Far Far Away…


(1:05:33)Deal 1: Commodities are Higher Forever, Right?


(1:18:41)What are THE lessons to learn

1
00:00:00,200 --> 00:00:04,560
Right now, Buddy Waters, we've
got an M and a special and well

2
00:00:04,560 --> 00:00:06,440
taking I'll probably pick the
wrong one here 'cause it's an

3
00:00:06,440 --> 00:00:10,760
M&A howlers special.
But possibly the greatest M&A of

4
00:00:10,760 --> 00:00:14,080
all time was done by Sambic for
the ground support division.

5
00:00:14,080 --> 00:00:16,320
So it's like the opposite of
what the show is about.

6
00:00:16,560 --> 00:00:22,040
But acquiring DSI is M and I
spectacular because getting DSI

7
00:00:22,040 --> 00:00:25,040
the Grand sport division in
means they pretty much got Derek

8
00:00:25,040 --> 00:00:27,320
Heard for free.
Derek came for free and they

9
00:00:27,320 --> 00:00:28,640
made that's vertical
integration.

10
00:00:28,640 --> 00:00:31,160
I mean, you were, you were a
jumbo operator in Sambic

11
00:00:31,160 --> 00:00:35,600
Machines and now guess what?
Sam jamming in Sambic Bolts.

12
00:00:35,600 --> 00:00:38,520
Brought to you by Derek Heard
and the team at Sambic Ground

13
00:00:38,520 --> 00:00:39,840
Support.
Derek.

14
00:00:39,840 --> 00:00:42,640
Derek alone was worth the €1
billion they paid.

15
00:00:42,800 --> 00:00:44,000
I don't think I'll be doubt
about it.

16
00:00:44,000 --> 00:00:46,280
Sorry, maybe I said it wrong.
They got the ground support

17
00:00:46,280 --> 00:00:49,680
division for free.
They paid a shit load for Derek

18
00:00:49,680 --> 00:00:52,080
Gerd.
Yes, go see money well spent.

19
00:00:52,080 --> 00:00:54,320
Go see a big ground sport.
Let's get into the M and a

20
00:00:54,400 --> 00:00:57,280
Howlers episode.
Right on money miners.

21
00:00:57,280 --> 00:01:02,440
We've got a JD Spectacular M and
A disasters, it's titled.

22
00:01:03,280 --> 00:01:05,920
Yeah.
Most or M&A mishaps, should we

23
00:01:05,920 --> 00:01:08,800
be a bit more positive, no
disasters?

24
00:01:08,880 --> 00:01:12,320
I think there's a silver lining
in in most things, Maddie, I did

25
00:01:12,320 --> 00:01:15,920
come at it wanting to to learn
about that disasters,

26
00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:19,520
specifically the Riversdale one.
But yeah, for for the money

27
00:01:19,520 --> 00:01:22,640
miners, we're going to talk
about five of the most valued

28
00:01:22,640 --> 00:01:27,400
destructive deals in in our
industry and hopefully learn a

29
00:01:27,400 --> 00:01:30,440
thing or two along the way about
the the history.

30
00:01:30,440 --> 00:01:32,600
What about what you can do
better as an investor, about

31
00:01:32,800 --> 00:01:35,400
what mining companies can do
better along the way.

32
00:01:35,400 --> 00:01:36,920
So it's a bit of a walk through
mining history.

33
00:01:36,920 --> 00:01:40,840
Best way to learn bad capital
allocation is pull out these

34
00:01:41,000 --> 00:01:43,000
these case studies and say I'm
not going to do that.

35
00:01:43,320 --> 00:01:46,360
Yeah, same can be said for for
stuff on the good side as well,

36
00:01:46,560 --> 00:01:47,760
which we'll get to in due
course.

37
00:01:47,760 --> 00:01:50,720
But there's, yeah, there's a one
or two things to say the least.

38
00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:54,920
It can be learnt from some of
these mishaps as you said.

39
00:01:55,160 --> 00:01:58,760
Yeah, So what, what what went
towards the shortlist?

40
00:01:58,760 --> 00:02:02,760
JD how did you determine what
was value destructive and what

41
00:02:02,760 --> 00:02:05,520
wasn't?
It was a bit sort of scattergun

42
00:02:05,520 --> 00:02:08,960
at first, so I decided to to
make a bit of a criteria for it

43
00:02:08,960 --> 00:02:12,120
and then go from there because
there's loads of different

44
00:02:12,960 --> 00:02:16,000
things that have happened over a
very long bit of time.

45
00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:18,840
So how I kind of went about it
was deals that have happened in

46
00:02:18,840 --> 00:02:22,880
the last 30 years and you know,
not very recent ones either

47
00:02:22,880 --> 00:02:25,440
because they really haven't had
the the appropriate amount of

48
00:02:25,440 --> 00:02:27,880
time to run their course.
You need a bit of a cycle or

49
00:02:27,880 --> 00:02:29,840
two.
And going beyond 30 years gets

50
00:02:29,840 --> 00:02:32,560
kind of hard on the on the
research side of things, Hard

51
00:02:32,560 --> 00:02:35,640
Rock commodities.
So the likes of BHB and Freeport

52
00:02:35,960 --> 00:02:39,160
venturing out into the oil and
gas world can be thankful.

53
00:02:39,480 --> 00:02:43,600
Going to keep to what we know.
The Hard Rock mining side of

54
00:02:43,600 --> 00:02:46,000
things.
Also, this is a kind of big one.

55
00:02:46,000 --> 00:02:50,240
They had to be an Aussie company
doing the buying, so not focused

56
00:02:50,240 --> 00:02:52,000
on other deals.
Maybe there's another episode in

57
00:02:52,000 --> 00:02:54,600
that in due course because
there's some very interesting

58
00:02:54,600 --> 00:02:57,400
deals that international
businesses have done, but this

59
00:02:57,400 --> 00:02:59,160
is an Aussie company doing the
buying.

60
00:02:59,360 --> 00:03:02,480
Aussie based or Aussie listed or
both listed?

61
00:03:02,560 --> 00:03:06,800
Yeah, Yeah.
Another big one is focusing on

62
00:03:06,800 --> 00:03:11,840
on out and out errors rather
than kind of errors of omission.

63
00:03:11,840 --> 00:03:15,880
So not talking about kind of
selling an asset at the at the

64
00:03:15,880 --> 00:03:18,320
worst possible time, you know,
at the bottom of a cycle there.

65
00:03:18,920 --> 00:03:21,720
They're big mistakes as well and
and you learn from them.

66
00:03:21,720 --> 00:03:25,080
But we're talking about deals
that were actually done and that

67
00:03:25,080 --> 00:03:28,000
resulted in big kind of
financial downside rather than

68
00:03:28,000 --> 00:03:31,160
foregone earnings kind of.
The flip The flip side of this

69
00:03:31,160 --> 00:03:33,120
is the sellers of all of these
deals had a great deal.

70
00:03:34,240 --> 00:03:36,680
They generally did, yeah.
The silver lining to everything,

71
00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:41,560
right and the last couple bits
and pieces is that they're not

72
00:03:41,560 --> 00:03:43,840
bad projects.
You know, this is this is deals.

73
00:03:43,840 --> 00:03:46,480
We're not talking about projects
that a company had and sunk

74
00:03:46,480 --> 00:03:48,240
money to that didn't quite go so
well.

75
00:03:49,040 --> 00:03:52,440
And yeah, I guess a feature you
sort of pick up along the way

76
00:03:52,440 --> 00:03:56,160
that you know, the the cash and
kind of script component, it all

77
00:03:56,600 --> 00:04:00,360
can often end up being a worse
deal depending on the structure

78
00:04:00,800 --> 00:04:03,840
of of that deal.
So that played a bit into the

79
00:04:03,840 --> 00:04:08,560
actual ranking of of the five.
Very good right out take it

80
00:04:08,560 --> 00:04:12,000
away.
Is these in order of at least

81
00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:14,880
shittest to my shittest?
I'll talk through the the

82
00:04:14,880 --> 00:04:18,640
ranking real quick because it is
super hard and pretty subjective

83
00:04:18,640 --> 00:04:21,360
to be honest.
I'm sure anyone could change the

84
00:04:21,360 --> 00:04:23,800
order as they kind of see
appropriate as well as change

85
00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:26,440
out the five as a little bit to
choose from.

86
00:04:26,440 --> 00:04:29,320
And it and it's kind of hard.
You know, things kind of change

87
00:04:29,320 --> 00:04:32,680
over time as, as you sort of
pick up in the deals and how

88
00:04:32,680 --> 00:04:34,920
badly they were rated, you know,
that can change.

89
00:04:35,200 --> 00:04:37,960
Say there's a commodity uptick
and maybe it's not quite as bad

90
00:04:37,960 --> 00:04:40,720
because you get a bit of
compensation down the track.

91
00:04:40,720 --> 00:04:43,800
But just to to speak to my
thinking, I'm thinking of a

92
00:04:43,800 --> 00:04:47,640
combination of how much money
was sunk in, particularly as a

93
00:04:47,640 --> 00:04:50,960
proportion of like your business
side, if you being the buyer are

94
00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:54,120
going towards it.
You know, was it a 5% of your

95
00:04:54,120 --> 00:04:57,640
market cap or we're talking
about 35% of your market cap?

96
00:04:58,600 --> 00:05:01,280
What kind of state that left you
in as well factored pretty

97
00:05:01,280 --> 00:05:05,000
heavily in in my thinking, if
you're able to ride it out kind

98
00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:08,920
of fine because the commodity
cycle continued to power on and

99
00:05:08,920 --> 00:05:11,760
took you through and maybe it
wasn't so bad.

100
00:05:11,760 --> 00:05:14,480
But if that was funded by a debt
and left you in a pretty

101
00:05:14,480 --> 00:05:18,840
perilous state and in, you know,
very, very bad shape in some of

102
00:05:18,840 --> 00:05:23,080
the cases, then that doesn't go
well toward the toward the the

103
00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:25,520
ranking.
So, yeah, all of that size, deal

104
00:05:25,520 --> 00:05:30,320
size, what time in the cycle
company's ability to recover?

105
00:05:30,320 --> 00:05:32,400
What happened to the management
team and the executives

106
00:05:32,680 --> 00:05:34,560
afterwards?
You know, did they sort of go on

107
00:05:34,560 --> 00:05:37,040
the the chopping block?
I did kind of think about the

108
00:05:37,120 --> 00:05:39,720
the rationale from executives,
how they thought about the deal,

109
00:05:39,720 --> 00:05:42,320
how outrageously confident some
of them were.

110
00:05:42,320 --> 00:05:44,160
Were there perfect?
Time incentives that motivated

111
00:05:44,160 --> 00:05:45,480
it.
Yep, that definitely.

112
00:05:45,800 --> 00:05:47,600
That definitely factored in.
So oh.

113
00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:49,880
Mate, I'm hanging on to me.
So JD come on.

114
00:05:50,240 --> 00:05:52,560
Group in mate all.
Right, let's start #5 Maddie

115
00:05:53,320 --> 00:05:56,880
Ucrest buys Lahir gold, So a big
gold deal.

116
00:05:56,880 --> 00:06:00,120
We're going back to 2010 for
this one gold.

117
00:06:00,120 --> 00:06:03,280
I'll set the same tearing higher
coming out of the GFC.

118
00:06:03,280 --> 00:06:07,840
So to dip down 2008 nine, it was
around US 700 ish in that kind

119
00:06:07,840 --> 00:06:11,960
of range in late 2008.
And by the time they're starting

120
00:06:11,960 --> 00:06:14,960
to talk about this deal and it's
getting announced in April of

121
00:06:14,960 --> 00:06:19,680
2010, gold is approaching US
1200 bucks, so.

122
00:06:19,680 --> 00:06:22,680
Right when Northern Star bought
their first gold asset, nearly.

123
00:06:22,680 --> 00:06:28,600
Yeah, there was this sort of
2010 to 2013 period was huge in

124
00:06:28,600 --> 00:06:31,200
shaping the landscape of the
gold industry.

125
00:06:31,200 --> 00:06:35,280
So New Crest is the buyer here.
They are the big Aussie gold

126
00:06:35,280 --> 00:06:38,240
champion, as everyone kind of
knows, kept at about 15 billion

127
00:06:38,240 --> 00:06:42,680
bucks at the time, in a time
where one Aussie dollar was

128
00:06:42,680 --> 00:06:45,840
buying you about 92 ish US
cents.

129
00:06:45,840 --> 00:06:49,880
So they've had, you know,
Telfer, Acadia, Krakow, Hidden

130
00:06:49,880 --> 00:06:53,400
Valley and Gosselong as their
operating assets at that point

131
00:06:53,400 --> 00:06:56,320
in time doing a bit over 1.6
million ounces.

132
00:06:56,440 --> 00:06:59,360
And that was the high day like
that was like the Telfer sub

133
00:06:59,360 --> 00:07:03,160
level cave when it was pumping.
Stock is at an all time high

134
00:07:03,160 --> 00:07:05,760
when they're going into this
deal and then you've got Lahia

135
00:07:05,760 --> 00:07:10,320
gold so they again an Aussie
listed one in in this case

136
00:07:10,680 --> 00:07:13,360
they're getting towards a
7:00-ish billion dollar Aussie

137
00:07:13,520 --> 00:07:15,400
market cap pre the bid.
Wow.

138
00:07:15,760 --> 00:07:21,080
They expanded the gold resource
at Lahia by 30 odd percent in 20

139
00:07:21,160 --> 00:07:25,960
and 2009, so the year before the
deal to a resource of 43,000,000

140
00:07:25,960 --> 00:07:28,840
oz.
So looking very, very pretty for

141
00:07:28,840 --> 00:07:32,120
a prospective buyer there.
And here was their crown jewel.

142
00:07:32,120 --> 00:07:34,200
It was about 75% of their
earnings.

143
00:07:34,520 --> 00:07:40,000
They also operated Mount Rawdon
and Bonnet Crowe, so 1.2 million

144
00:07:40,000 --> 00:07:42,600
oz.
Not actually crazy amounts

145
00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:43,920
smaller.
It's just the sort of

146
00:07:44,160 --> 00:07:45,960
jurisdiction and the nature of
those answers and the

147
00:07:45,960 --> 00:07:51,440
profitability that leads to the
desperate market caps between

148
00:07:51,440 --> 00:07:53,720
the two companies.
One other thing to bear in mind

149
00:07:53,720 --> 00:07:57,240
in the context here is resource
rent tax, a big deal.

150
00:07:57,240 --> 00:08:00,920
We had Gina Twiggy Hyvee's
marching down the terrace.

151
00:08:00,920 --> 00:08:05,160
This was huge in this time and
it led to a lot of the operators

152
00:08:05,160 --> 00:08:08,160
looking overseas as opposed to
in Australia because they were

153
00:08:08,160 --> 00:08:10,960
scared of what a potential
taxation environment might do to

154
00:08:10,960 --> 00:08:13,000
an asset here.
Gotcha, Gotcha.

155
00:08:13,400 --> 00:08:14,880
It's a short term.
You're thinking I've got to

156
00:08:14,880 --> 00:08:17,840
diversify my earnings overseas.
Yeah, the economics just look

157
00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:23,280
comparatively a bit better.
So the deal itself, April Fool's

158
00:08:23,280 --> 00:08:28,040
Day actually in 2010 LGL, that's
Lahia, rejected a scheme of

159
00:08:28,040 --> 00:08:31,840
arrangement from Newcrest.
And funnily enough, this was the

160
00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:34,320
same day that Lahia had a new
CEO take charge.

161
00:08:34,320 --> 00:08:38,080
So this CEO did quite well for
himself. 4,000,000 bucks he

162
00:08:38,080 --> 00:08:40,039
earned in a four month stint at
the business.

163
00:08:40,600 --> 00:08:43,440
Newcrest were $10.
Yeah, Yeah.

164
00:08:44,240 --> 00:08:48,720
Back when it meant something new
crests were offering one share

165
00:08:48,720 --> 00:08:52,280
for every 9 LGL shares, plus a
cash kicker in there.

166
00:08:52,280 --> 00:08:55,960
So they valued here at 9
billion, which was a a bit over

167
00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:58,840
a 30% premium, you kind of
standard premium.

168
00:08:58,880 --> 00:09:01,720
But it was revealed in the docs
that they'd actually had a swing

169
00:09:01,720 --> 00:09:05,400
a couple months before and this
was a 12% increase on their

170
00:09:05,400 --> 00:09:08,640
previous bid.
So a more than a billion dollars

171
00:09:08,640 --> 00:09:09,800
to the price tag.
Who?

172
00:09:09,800 --> 00:09:11,080
Who revealed it?
JD.

173
00:09:12,480 --> 00:09:15,520
It came out in in the docs that
I think had a a new Crest.

174
00:09:16,080 --> 00:09:18,040
Yeah, tag on.
But the very first public

175
00:09:18,040 --> 00:09:21,240
announcement, did it come from
New Crest or did it come out of

176
00:09:21,440 --> 00:09:23,720
YEAH?
It came at it.

177
00:09:25,640 --> 00:09:30,560
It came out of Lahia saying they
had rejected the proposal.

178
00:09:30,680 --> 00:09:33,080
Yeah.
And then, you know, both of them

179
00:09:33,080 --> 00:09:35,880
come out with an announcement on
on the same day and subsequent

180
00:09:36,320 --> 00:09:38,680
as well.
Regardless, Lahia wanted a price

181
00:09:38,680 --> 00:09:41,280
bump and ultimately they would
get it.

182
00:09:41,280 --> 00:09:44,040
So you've got this sort of
classic period in in takeover

183
00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:48,760
games where Newcrest just
stresses their cost discipline,

184
00:09:48,760 --> 00:09:51,920
how they're, you know, going to
be very disciplined in their

185
00:09:51,920 --> 00:09:54,200
approach to how they pay for the
year.

186
00:09:54,640 --> 00:09:58,560
And LGI was just telling the
world why the bid undervalues

187
00:09:58,560 --> 00:10:01,160
them.
So in the background, gold

188
00:10:01,160 --> 00:10:04,720
continues to to tear higher
actually, and it actually

189
00:10:04,720 --> 00:10:08,840
finishes that year at close to
1400 bucks an ounce.

190
00:10:08,840 --> 00:10:12,960
So a pretty mighty movement in
the space of about two years on

191
00:10:12,960 --> 00:10:15,840
the gold front.
Give it a month or so and the

192
00:10:15,840 --> 00:10:18,080
deal reaches its kind of
conclusion.

193
00:10:18,440 --> 00:10:21,720
New Crest, improve it again.
They value LGL at about $9.5

194
00:10:21,720 --> 00:10:25,240
billion.
Cash makes up about 500 of that.

195
00:10:25,240 --> 00:10:27,640
And a few months later the deal
closes.

196
00:10:27,640 --> 00:10:28,720
So they accept.
It.

197
00:10:29,280 --> 00:10:35,960
Did and the the marriage code
ends up being about 36% LGL and

198
00:10:36,040 --> 00:10:39,880
the remainder were the UCREST
shareholders who gobble them up

199
00:10:39,880 --> 00:10:45,040
in this merged entity and they
go to a net debt position of

200
00:10:45,040 --> 00:10:50,160
about Aussie 300 which ends up
blowing out because CapEx needs

201
00:10:50,160 --> 00:10:52,720
to be spent which I'll get to,
but this creates the fourth

202
00:10:52,720 --> 00:10:54,840
biggest gold producer in the
world.

203
00:10:55,440 --> 00:10:58,000
Wow, that is phenomenal.
Just saying that, that

204
00:10:58,080 --> 00:11:01,560
percentage pro form of just
considering the assets that is

205
00:11:01,560 --> 00:11:02,880
unbelievable.
It is right.

206
00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:07,440
So interesting.
So thinking about how Newcrest

207
00:11:07,440 --> 00:11:10,400
management pitched this deal to
its own shareholders was kind of

208
00:11:10,400 --> 00:11:13,000
interesting to to read into.
They're saying we're buying a

209
00:11:13,000 --> 00:11:15,800
heap of answers and we're buying
them cheaply because they're in

210
00:11:15,800 --> 00:11:18,640
PNG of course.
And they're also saying that

211
00:11:18,640 --> 00:11:21,600
these answers are going to be
low cost to produce, which is

212
00:11:21,600 --> 00:11:23,200
something that doesn't
ultimately end up really being

213
00:11:23,200 --> 00:11:24,200
true.
They're talking about

214
00:11:24,520 --> 00:11:26,880
geographical diversification as
well.

215
00:11:27,280 --> 00:11:29,400
And all up it's pretty light on
synergies.

216
00:11:29,400 --> 00:11:32,880
There's not awful aside from the
corporate side of synergies

217
00:11:32,880 --> 00:11:36,480
taking place in, in this deal.
They do stress that they're

218
00:11:37,000 --> 00:11:39,840
experience in Indonesia will
help them handle the the

219
00:11:39,840 --> 00:11:43,160
complexity of here and operating
in in that part.

220
00:11:43,520 --> 00:11:45,760
But they lay out this beautiful
growth picture.

221
00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:49,440
They're going to 3.75 million
ounces in five years time.

222
00:11:50,120 --> 00:11:53,160
And you know, sadly they're not
only end up getting to a bit of

223
00:11:53,160 --> 00:11:56,320
a 60%.
If you look at the FY20 14

224
00:11:56,320 --> 00:11:59,600
numbers and how it actually
compares at that point in time

225
00:11:59,600 --> 00:12:01,440
that they didn't get anywhere
near it.

226
00:12:01,440 --> 00:12:06,480
They just wanted a a much bigger
production profile and this was

227
00:12:06,560 --> 00:12:09,480
this was a roaring gold gold
bull market.

228
00:12:09,480 --> 00:12:11,920
Like we have to really let that
sink in.

229
00:12:11,920 --> 00:12:15,480
Things were going gangbusters.
These guys all of all the the

230
00:12:15,480 --> 00:12:17,640
gold industry is hitting all
time highs.

231
00:12:18,360 --> 00:12:21,880
Gold is high for longer.
You know, people are pumped up

232
00:12:22,400 --> 00:12:25,440
and management is sort of
rationalizing this deal because

233
00:12:25,960 --> 00:12:29,200
in their words, it positions new
Crest to fully participate in

234
00:12:29,200 --> 00:12:31,000
the current strong gold price
environment.

235
00:12:31,360 --> 00:12:33,840
And would that have been the
same time when poor girl was

236
00:12:33,840 --> 00:12:36,880
probably pumping for Barrick in
PNG?

237
00:12:36,880 --> 00:12:39,560
So PNG would have.
I believe so you.

238
00:12:39,560 --> 00:12:42,720
Know appeared to be a friendly
jurisdiction.

239
00:12:43,160 --> 00:12:46,080
Yeah.
So 2010 to 2015 was an

240
00:12:46,080 --> 00:12:51,360
interesting time for PNG.
There were, once it comes into

241
00:12:51,360 --> 00:12:53,320
Newcrest ownership, a fair few
disruptions.

242
00:12:53,320 --> 00:12:57,880
Protests didn't tend to hold up
the mind for too long, but it

243
00:12:57,880 --> 00:13:00,640
did seem the years later we're a
bit more disruptive.

244
00:13:00,840 --> 00:13:06,400
This block was picky, but I
think the economic regime was a

245
00:13:06,400 --> 00:13:09,760
bit friendlier at that time, so
it has changed a bit since then.

246
00:13:10,280 --> 00:13:11,160
So what went?
Wrong.

247
00:13:12,280 --> 00:13:15,800
A combination in in this deal
made things really go pear

248
00:13:15,800 --> 00:13:17,520
shaped.
Firstly, they, they got the

249
00:13:17,520 --> 00:13:22,800
cycle wrong and that wasn't
apparent at first glance because

250
00:13:22,800 --> 00:13:27,240
they had awesomely profitable
years in 2011 as well as 2012.

251
00:13:27,240 --> 00:13:30,920
They were the most profitable
years in the company's history.

252
00:13:31,920 --> 00:13:33,880
And you know, you had that
beautiful period, kind of like

253
00:13:33,880 --> 00:13:37,120
where we're at now where the,
the gold price runs and costs

254
00:13:37,120 --> 00:13:41,200
just can't keep place with the
the run up in the commodity

255
00:13:41,200 --> 00:13:44,280
price and you actually get
outsized returns for a year or

256
00:13:44,280 --> 00:13:49,320
two before things catch up.
And 2013 saw the gold price down

257
00:13:49,640 --> 00:13:55,000
30% in that one year alone,
right as the company expanded on

258
00:13:55,000 --> 00:13:59,240
to a a massive CapEx cycle.
They wanted to hit those more oz

259
00:13:59,240 --> 00:14:02,960
that they promised.
So the excess returns from those

260
00:14:02,960 --> 00:14:05,440
two years didn't go back to to
shareholders.

261
00:14:05,960 --> 00:14:07,920
The intentions weren't kind of
bad, you know, but they were

262
00:14:07,920 --> 00:14:10,920
just they got the timing wrong.
They spent US 1.3 billion on

263
00:14:10,920 --> 00:14:14,360
CapEx at here that ended up
blowing out, ended up being more

264
00:14:14,360 --> 00:14:18,360
than that and ended up coming
much later than planned as well.

265
00:14:18,360 --> 00:14:20,920
They wanted to hit 1,000,000 oz
per annum and they just never

266
00:14:20,920 --> 00:14:26,160
reached those levels at here.
It was just all around slower

267
00:14:26,160 --> 00:14:28,040
and more costly than I'd
anticipated.

268
00:14:28,520 --> 00:14:31,800
And the operating costs, you
know, this is the expansion I've

269
00:14:31,800 --> 00:14:34,720
mentioned, but the operating
costs didn't meet the the target

270
00:14:35,080 --> 00:14:36,560
either.
Then you've got those community

271
00:14:36,560 --> 00:14:40,800
related challenges at the here
that it is touched on as well as

272
00:14:40,800 --> 00:14:45,000
this kind of interesting,
interesting bit of news from

273
00:14:45,000 --> 00:14:47,560
2014.
This wasn't a huge impact.

274
00:14:47,560 --> 00:14:49,000
It kind of got sidetracked
because I found it so

275
00:14:49,000 --> 00:14:53,000
interesting, but it was a very
well publicized selective

276
00:14:53,000 --> 00:14:56,200
disclosure fine that EUCRIS had
to pay.

277
00:14:56,560 --> 00:14:59,480
What this was was the investor
relations team telling analysts

278
00:14:59,480 --> 00:15:03,160
to chalk down your CapEx, lift
the CapEx numbers and chalk down

279
00:15:03,160 --> 00:15:05,800
the the production numbers
because we're not going to make

280
00:15:05,800 --> 00:15:06,880
them.
And they try to sort of soften

281
00:15:06,880 --> 00:15:10,320
up the market.
And they ended up being a class

282
00:15:10,320 --> 00:15:13,320
action lawsuit and nearly a $40
million fine got laid on the

283
00:15:13,320 --> 00:15:16,480
company because you can't do
that at the end of the day.

284
00:15:16,480 --> 00:15:19,160
So yeah, there's a lot of people
I know in the industry that know

285
00:15:19,160 --> 00:15:23,080
that one quite well.
It wasn't it wasn't a a good

286
00:15:23,080 --> 00:15:26,360
sort of sequence of events and
it didn't reflect well on sort

287
00:15:26,360 --> 00:15:29,360
of company itself.
The actual fine from ASIC was

288
00:15:29,640 --> 00:15:33,760
pretty poultry, but the the sort
of backfall from that was was

289
00:15:33,760 --> 00:15:36,720
pretty gnarly it.
Was a lot of the the missing

290
00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:39,440
answers?
Was it metallurgically related?

291
00:15:39,440 --> 00:15:42,520
Because it's a it's a pox
operation, isn't it?

292
00:15:42,560 --> 00:15:44,040
Yeah, Yeah, that's right.
It.

293
00:15:44,760 --> 00:15:46,920
I mean, take your pick.
There was challenges, just

294
00:15:46,960 --> 00:15:49,320
everything.
Yeah, there's challenges on a

295
00:15:49,320 --> 00:15:53,760
lot of different fronts there to
to speak to the other two assets

296
00:15:53,760 --> 00:15:57,560
because I said here was 75% of
the earnings EUCRIS sold Mount

297
00:15:57,560 --> 00:16:02,520
Rawdon and it's Krakau stake to
a group that ends up being

298
00:16:02,600 --> 00:16:07,160
evolution very interesting.
So that happened in 2011 they.

299
00:16:07,360 --> 00:16:10,000
They have to do that.
Was that like because the CapEx

300
00:16:10,000 --> 00:16:12,560
and debt that time they chose to
do it?

301
00:16:12,760 --> 00:16:16,600
They chose to wow like 2011 was
the good times and that was just

302
00:16:16,600 --> 00:16:18,040
rationalization of the
portfolio.

303
00:16:18,880 --> 00:16:22,080
They ended up having a stake
that was north of 300 million at

304
00:16:22,080 --> 00:16:24,800
the time, but they sell that
three or four years down the

305
00:16:24,800 --> 00:16:28,640
track for a bit over 200.
So yeah, it wasn't sort of

306
00:16:28,960 --> 00:16:32,160
executed so well.
And that other bonecrow asset in

307
00:16:32,160 --> 00:16:37,080
West Africa was cashed in for 80
bucks years later in in 2017.

308
00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:41,720
So what happens to to the
executives that were part of

309
00:16:42,000 --> 00:16:44,120
part of putting this deal to the
to the board?

310
00:16:44,280 --> 00:16:47,600
Well, this is an interesting one
and we'll see a repeat of this.

311
00:16:47,600 --> 00:16:51,040
The CEO left very shortly after
the deal in in 2011.

312
00:16:51,040 --> 00:16:54,320
So at the time when that CEO
left things were looking pretty

313
00:16:54,320 --> 00:16:56,440
cruisy.
Ultimately though, on an

314
00:16:56,440 --> 00:16:59,560
accounting front, the HERE
assets get impaired by 4 billion

315
00:16:59,880 --> 00:17:02,800
just three years or less than
three years after the deal in

316
00:17:02,800 --> 00:17:07,280
2013 and then by a further
almost 3 billion a year later.

317
00:17:07,520 --> 00:17:09,720
So that is a pretty hefty write
down.

318
00:17:09,839 --> 00:17:11,520
Is that that when sand out
coming?

319
00:17:12,040 --> 00:17:16,960
Oh, I assume. 20/14/15.
Oh, so he he didn't replace the

320
00:17:16,960 --> 00:17:18,359
CEO in 28?
Yeah.

321
00:17:18,839 --> 00:17:24,319
They pay 9 1/2 billion and and
within four years 7.9 billion is

322
00:17:24,319 --> 00:17:25,359
impaired.
Plus they would have spent a

323
00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:27,520
bunch on CapEx as well.
Yeah, and if you want to try and

324
00:17:27,520 --> 00:17:32,320
be be friendly to to Newcrest,
just Google write downs 2013

325
00:17:32,320 --> 00:17:35,600
gold industry and there's a top
ten list and they're all

326
00:17:36,160 --> 00:17:38,320
disastrous.
That's what happens when the

327
00:17:38,320 --> 00:17:42,040
gold price peels off massively.
The impairment is an accounting

328
00:17:42,040 --> 00:17:45,400
thing, but it doesn't reflect
well and the assets were nowhere

329
00:17:45,400 --> 00:17:48,440
near as profitable and the
opportunity cost from giving

330
00:17:48,440 --> 00:17:52,040
away 36% of your business is
just phenomenal.

331
00:17:52,040 --> 00:17:56,000
So the stock goes from about 40
bucks a share to below 8 bucks

332
00:17:56,040 --> 00:18:00,840
in two years time. 10 years
later it gets taken out at $23.

333
00:18:00,840 --> 00:18:03,960
It was about four bucks of
dividends paid in that period,

334
00:18:03,960 --> 00:18:07,440
but yeah, it it was very, very
tough.

335
00:18:07,480 --> 00:18:12,680
New Crest generated cumulative
cumulative free cash flow over

336
00:18:12,680 --> 00:18:17,120
that five year period, 2010 to
14 of -2 1/2 billion dollars.

337
00:18:17,880 --> 00:18:20,960
Operationally there.
There wasn't a single year after

338
00:18:20,960 --> 00:18:25,600
completion until New Crest got
taken over in 2023 that

339
00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:29,440
production met or even got close
to really that target that they

340
00:18:29,440 --> 00:18:33,000
set in 2010.
Not a single year in in 14

341
00:18:33,000 --> 00:18:36,360
years.
So here's an asset that's, you

342
00:18:36,360 --> 00:18:38,760
know, still still producing for
the Newmont.

343
00:18:38,760 --> 00:18:41,520
So it's not a complete lot in
these sorts of prices.

344
00:18:41,520 --> 00:18:44,960
It, it makes money again, that's
that's kind of why it's ranked

345
00:18:44,960 --> 00:18:47,800
5th.
But the the opportunity cost

346
00:18:47,800 --> 00:18:49,920
there is just massive and I
think it's the sort of

347
00:18:49,920 --> 00:18:53,320
quintessential example of that
2010 era gold M&A.

348
00:18:53,760 --> 00:19:00,400
Yeah, very good Jade deal #4.
Gone to America, BHB buys Magma

349
00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:02,200
copper.
This is the oldest deal on the

350
00:19:02,200 --> 00:19:05,200
list.
This deal happened in late 1995

351
00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:09,800
and amongst other it amongst
other deals that BHB did at the

352
00:19:09,800 --> 00:19:13,560
time, it took the the big
Australian to their knees in the

353
00:19:13,560 --> 00:19:16,080
late 90s, which was really,
really interesting to learn

354
00:19:16,080 --> 00:19:17,360
about.
I'm fascinated mate.

355
00:19:18,200 --> 00:19:21,320
So we'll give a bit of a bit of
context to sort of set the set

356
00:19:21,320 --> 00:19:23,360
the field.
BHB wanted more copper.

357
00:19:23,640 --> 00:19:28,800
The old story come new and as it
is a bit of a theme on this

358
00:19:28,800 --> 00:19:31,720
list, 1995 was an absolute
record year for copper prices.

359
00:19:31,720 --> 00:19:36,720
So it's tear and a head.
It's over $1.30 USA pound.

360
00:19:37,080 --> 00:19:39,920
Now Magma importantly, was not
just a miner that had smelting

361
00:19:39,920 --> 00:19:42,920
capability and BHP didn't have
that.

362
00:19:42,920 --> 00:19:48,720
So that meshing of concentrate
and downstream capacity very

363
00:19:48,720 --> 00:19:52,280
similar to what we're seeing
today with the changes between

364
00:19:52,280 --> 00:19:55,200
who has the power between the
concentrate producer and the the

365
00:19:55,200 --> 00:19:57,760
smelters was a big factor in
this deal.

366
00:19:58,440 --> 00:20:01,920
Magma was a spin out at Newmont.
So they came out in 1987.

367
00:20:02,240 --> 00:20:05,360
They were their own kind of
entity subsidiary that became

368
00:20:05,360 --> 00:20:07,760
its own thing.
They owned 3 mines in

369
00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:10,120
Southeastern Arizona.
Some of these names might be

370
00:20:10,120 --> 00:20:13,160
familiar.
You've got San Manuel that came

371
00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:16,520
with a smelter as well.
Superior and Pinto Valley, and

372
00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:20,760
then you've got Robinson in
Nevada and Tintaya in Peru,

373
00:20:20,760 --> 00:20:23,960
which I'll explain later will
also be familiar to a lot of the

374
00:20:23,960 --> 00:20:26,520
listeners out there.
Very America's focused North

375
00:20:26,520 --> 00:20:28,400
America, a little bit of South
America there.

376
00:20:28,400 --> 00:20:31,880
Yeah, eighth biggest copper
producer in the world.

377
00:20:32,240 --> 00:20:36,640
And there's this this headline
sort of at the time Magma was

378
00:20:36,640 --> 00:20:40,680
the acquisition that BHB had to
make to meet it's voracious

379
00:20:40,680 --> 00:20:44,760
copper demands.
So that, yeah, that that ability

380
00:20:44,760 --> 00:20:49,120
to get the smelting side of the
business can't be understated.

381
00:20:49,120 --> 00:20:51,240
It's a, it's a key part of why
they did this deal.

382
00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:55,720
And the yeah, the San Manuel
smelter in Arizona there was the

383
00:20:55,720 --> 00:20:58,480
biggest in the US and it was
capable of being expanded.

384
00:20:58,480 --> 00:21:01,960
They had big plans for that one.
So that was the the crux of kind

385
00:21:01,960 --> 00:21:05,560
of why they did this deal.
Magma itself had gone through a

386
00:21:05,560 --> 00:21:09,680
really, really tough time in the
80s, but they'd turned that

387
00:21:09,680 --> 00:21:12,640
around coming into the 90s and
they up into this deal, those

388
00:21:12,640 --> 00:21:14,520
sort of five years were making
really good money.

389
00:21:15,440 --> 00:21:18,000
All type well record high copper
price probably helped to that.

390
00:21:18,360 --> 00:21:19,120
Period.
Massively.

391
00:21:19,480 --> 00:21:20,680
No surprise.
What was the deal?

392
00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:28,040
So BHB pays over Aussie $3.2
billion and Magma came with US

393
00:21:28,040 --> 00:21:30,080
600 million in debt.
Gotcha.

394
00:21:30,080 --> 00:21:31,400
They've assumed the debt.
Yeah, yeah.

395
00:21:31,560 --> 00:21:35,760
So this makes BHB the largest,
largest publicly traded copper

396
00:21:35,760 --> 00:21:38,680
producer in the world with about
10% of world production.

397
00:21:39,400 --> 00:21:43,000
They paid a 30 odd percent
premium kind of the the standard

398
00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:46,640
and it was relatively clean
because they got that off well

399
00:21:46,640 --> 00:21:49,760
known U.S. group Warburg Pincus
in the sort of banking world

400
00:21:49,760 --> 00:21:52,080
there.
They paid cash for this deal

401
00:21:52,400 --> 00:21:55,600
mostly using their cash
reserves, but they also tapped

402
00:21:55,600 --> 00:22:00,640
up their existing credit line.
So if you annualize Magma's

403
00:22:00,640 --> 00:22:02,720
previous quarter's earnings,
they're coming out at about US

404
00:22:02,760 --> 00:22:06,120
200 million.
And like you said, Trev, you

405
00:22:06,120 --> 00:22:08,600
know, we're talking about a time
with record prices.

406
00:22:08,600 --> 00:22:12,040
So given how much they paid, it
already looks pretty chunky

407
00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:15,440
already factoring a fair bit of
a fair bit of growth.

408
00:22:15,440 --> 00:22:19,320
And there was this sort of New
York Times headline from a quote

409
00:22:19,320 --> 00:22:22,200
from I think a broker at the
time saying I couldn't believe

410
00:22:22,200 --> 00:22:27,280
they paid 3.2 billion so.
So it's 16 times earnings, yeah.

411
00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:30,640
Yeah.
Doesn't look good in U In US

412
00:22:30,680 --> 00:22:36,040
it's Oh yeah, two yeah 2.4 so
it's 12. 200 million. 12 * 12

413
00:22:36,040 --> 00:22:39,480
times peak peak earnings yeah,
yeah.

414
00:22:40,120 --> 00:22:45,680
With that debt coming in it, it
screened a bit expensive, so.

415
00:22:46,120 --> 00:22:50,800
As I wear Did it go to shit, JD?
So this one is a bit unique

416
00:22:50,800 --> 00:22:52,320
versus the other ones I'm going
to talk about.

417
00:22:52,320 --> 00:22:54,520
The first thing I'm going to
focus on is the cultural

418
00:22:54,520 --> 00:22:58,400
disaster that this one was.
There were serious failures to

419
00:22:58,400 --> 00:23:02,000
integrate the the team and
manage the mines appropriately.

420
00:23:02,000 --> 00:23:04,880
So obviously this one happened a
long time ago.

421
00:23:04,880 --> 00:23:06,720
I'm working off a lot of
commentary that was given by

422
00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:09,920
people that worked at Magma
Copper as well as at BHB at the

423
00:23:09,920 --> 00:23:11,880
time.
But Magma had a super regional

424
00:23:12,200 --> 00:23:14,680
Arizona identity, as I sort of
understand it.

425
00:23:15,120 --> 00:23:18,400
And worlds away you've got BHB
execs making the calls.

426
00:23:18,400 --> 00:23:23,040
So you could add to that the the
argument that BHB has a bit of a

427
00:23:23,040 --> 00:23:26,280
bulk mining mindset.
I think that's kind of

428
00:23:26,720 --> 00:23:28,800
warranted.
They made a lot of their money

429
00:23:28,800 --> 00:23:30,880
obviously, and iron ore as well
as energy.

430
00:23:30,880 --> 00:23:35,040
So what they were doing here was
not what they were doing.

431
00:23:35,720 --> 00:23:39,080
You know, it wasn't their sort
of classical way of operating.

432
00:23:39,080 --> 00:23:40,920
It needed a bit of different
thinking and it didn't really

433
00:23:40,920 --> 00:23:43,200
get that.
So a lot of accusations of BHB

434
00:23:43,200 --> 00:23:46,960
being pretty arrogant and a bit
too rigid in their management in

435
00:23:46,960 --> 00:23:49,760
this one.
You've also got to look at the

436
00:23:49,760 --> 00:23:53,480
the fundamental issues with the
DD that BHB undertook.

437
00:23:53,480 --> 00:23:57,720
And what I'm kind of getting at
is the assumptions for how much

438
00:23:57,720 --> 00:23:59,680
better they thought they could
run the assets than was

439
00:23:59,680 --> 00:24:01,960
currently being run.
And I think that ties in with

440
00:24:02,280 --> 00:24:05,680
the arrogance kind of point in a
way they they thought they knew

441
00:24:05,680 --> 00:24:08,040
a lot better than the locals on
the ground there.

442
00:24:08,040 --> 00:24:12,320
And I think this comment from a
Magma exec just captures it

443
00:24:12,320 --> 00:24:15,400
perfectly.
Magma had mediocre, mediocre

444
00:24:15,400 --> 00:24:20,600
assets run extraordinarily.
BHB had extraordinary assets run

445
00:24:20,600 --> 00:24:24,240
mediocrely.
So that to me just tease it up

446
00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:27,520
kind of perfectly.
So adding to those cultural

447
00:24:27,520 --> 00:24:30,760
challenges, you've got the
commodity cycle.

448
00:24:31,080 --> 00:24:34,760
They bought this asset at all
time high price and that's

449
00:24:34,760 --> 00:24:37,160
usually not a recipe for
success.

450
00:24:37,160 --> 00:24:42,160
So no, no exceptions here.
And it's like you sort of see

451
00:24:42,160 --> 00:24:45,400
often in the corporate world,
the, the sensor FOMO is not that

452
00:24:45,400 --> 00:24:47,960
different to your regular kind
of retail hunter.

453
00:24:47,960 --> 00:24:49,680
Everyone, everyone's human at
the end of the day.

454
00:24:49,680 --> 00:24:53,240
And that was very much a a
factor in this deal.

455
00:24:53,840 --> 00:24:58,120
Copper was trading near $0.60
ultimately when BHB pulled the

456
00:24:58,120 --> 00:25:01,480
pin and it was not a long time
later, that was just a a short

457
00:25:01,480 --> 00:25:03,720
few years later.
So their conservative assumption

458
00:25:03,720 --> 00:25:08,040
in this deal was that copper
would not fall below $1.00 a

459
00:25:08,040 --> 00:25:11,280
pound.
And in reality these assets at

460
00:25:11,280 --> 00:25:15,560
$0.95 were losing money.
So it, it was very interesting

461
00:25:15,560 --> 00:25:18,960
for me to learn that copper hit
a century low in inflation

462
00:25:18,960 --> 00:25:23,880
adjusted terms in 2000.
So that completely, completely

463
00:25:23,880 --> 00:25:27,880
whacked them around and you
know, any chance of synergies

464
00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:30,320
were kind of wiped out with the
assets not even running.

465
00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:31,440
So they shut them down.
So.

466
00:25:31,640 --> 00:25:33,960
So they shut, they shut all of
all of the assets down.

467
00:25:34,440 --> 00:25:37,920
Pretty, pretty much, yeah.
Even with LIKE, smelters aren't

468
00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:40,840
easy to to restart.
It it takes, it takes a bit of

469
00:25:40,840 --> 00:25:44,040
time and I think I sort of go
through a couple of the assets,

470
00:25:44,040 --> 00:25:47,200
but I've got very sidetracked
with a couple fascinating

471
00:25:47,200 --> 00:25:49,640
things, right?
So you've got the Asian

472
00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:51,480
financial crisis happening in
1997.

473
00:25:51,480 --> 00:25:54,480
So this added to the fall off in
copper prices.

474
00:25:55,040 --> 00:25:59,680
And there's this story about
this trader at Sumitomo, which

475
00:25:59,720 --> 00:26:03,120
is very, very fascinating in, in
my opinion.

476
00:26:03,400 --> 00:26:05,680
And it is completely shook
around the copper market.

477
00:26:05,680 --> 00:26:09,440
And it impacted BHB in the sense
that earnings obviously just

478
00:26:09,720 --> 00:26:11,760
went through the floor.
This could be worthy of its own

479
00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:13,320
episode.
But Long story short, you've got

480
00:26:13,320 --> 00:26:16,480
this commodity trader from
Sumitomo in Japan.

481
00:26:16,480 --> 00:26:22,000
His name is Yasuo Tamanaka, and
he essentially traded on an

482
00:26:22,000 --> 00:26:25,520
unauthorized account for over a
decade and just hit everything

483
00:26:25,520 --> 00:26:28,720
he did.
This started, you know, as it

484
00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:33,320
tends to with him trying to make
up earnings that he'd had will

485
00:26:33,320 --> 00:26:36,520
make up a loss.
They done in, I want to say

486
00:26:36,720 --> 00:26:41,800
1986, a long time before.
And how he tries to make up

487
00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:44,840
those earnings is by cornering
the copper market using a whole

488
00:26:44,840 --> 00:26:46,960
bunch of futures, warrants and
other instruments.

489
00:26:46,960 --> 00:26:49,520
And this is the copper market
we're talking about.

490
00:26:49,520 --> 00:26:51,440
This is a big market.
It is a big market.

491
00:26:51,440 --> 00:26:57,400
And eventually in about 96, he
manages to get credit lines of

492
00:26:57,400 --> 00:27:01,520
to the sort of tune tune of US
$150 million from over a dozen

493
00:27:01,520 --> 00:27:05,040
banks, like not cumulatively
each.

494
00:27:05,520 --> 00:27:09,280
So this all just employed
massively in mid 96.

495
00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:11,880
And then there's this
investigation at the time to

496
00:27:11,880 --> 00:27:14,600
what's going on in LME
warehouses because the

497
00:27:14,600 --> 00:27:17,720
inventories are just draining
and this kind of sparks are kind

498
00:27:17,720 --> 00:27:20,160
of rushed.
The copper price falls 40% as

499
00:27:20,160 --> 00:27:22,680
Sumitomo try and unwind their
position.

500
00:27:22,920 --> 00:27:26,920
They end up copping AUS $2.8
billion loss in 19. 96 holy

501
00:27:27,360 --> 00:27:28,080
shit.
Yeah.

502
00:27:28,720 --> 00:27:30,320
Wow.
And he's trying to squeeze the

503
00:27:30,320 --> 00:27:32,640
market.
He was trying to squeeze it

504
00:27:32,640 --> 00:27:35,120
higher but it went, it went
completely tips up and then they

505
00:27:35,120 --> 00:27:40,240
had to sell everything.
So oh man, that's that's, that's

506
00:27:40,240 --> 00:27:42,400
an incredible part of history.
Yeah, I know it's going to

507
00:27:42,400 --> 00:27:47,640
happen sooner or later, but
yeah, there's a whole bunch of

508
00:27:47,640 --> 00:27:49,480
other alleys I could get
sidetracked down, but we'll

509
00:27:49,480 --> 00:27:51,960
we'll stay on route here.
Don't worry about that, JD.

510
00:27:52,200 --> 00:27:54,960
This is interesting.
There was a bunch of other

511
00:27:54,960 --> 00:27:58,840
mishaps for BHP that hit him
like a truck all at the same

512
00:27:58,840 --> 00:28:00,920
time.
And I just mentioned a couple of

513
00:28:00,920 --> 00:28:05,200
them, but you've got the HBI
plant, which was a complete and

514
00:28:05,200 --> 00:28:10,000
utter disaster in Port Hedland
and it sadly ended in the loss

515
00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:14,160
of life in with a with an
explosion there in the early

516
00:28:14,160 --> 00:28:18,240
2000s that cost them $2.4
billion.

517
00:28:18,240 --> 00:28:21,360
What's the HBI plan A?
Hot briqueted iron plant.

518
00:28:21,360 --> 00:28:24,480
So, you know, kind of what other
miners are talking about these

519
00:28:24,480 --> 00:28:25,600
days.
They were trying to do that

520
00:28:25,600 --> 00:28:28,680
there.
It was a, you know, $2.4 billion

521
00:28:28,680 --> 00:28:31,040
used to mean something for BHP.
That was a big amount of money

522
00:28:31,040 --> 00:28:34,960
just like this deal.
And that just didn't work

523
00:28:34,960 --> 00:28:37,440
whatsoever.
They had the Hartley Platts mine

524
00:28:37,440 --> 00:28:41,400
in Zimbabwe that cost them $700
million.

525
00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:46,440
Octady Complete and other
disaster, no other kind of way

526
00:28:46,440 --> 00:28:50,760
to put that one that they
eventually got out pretty much

527
00:28:50,760 --> 00:28:52,720
giving away their stake and
paying a heap.

528
00:28:52,720 --> 00:28:55,560
So they can kind of came out
with a $2 billion loss on that

529
00:28:55,560 --> 00:28:58,600
one.
And added to that, you've got

530
00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:02,360
pretty much every copper, I'm
sorry, every commodity in which

531
00:29:02,360 --> 00:29:05,520
they're operating hitting cycle
lows at the same time.

532
00:29:05,800 --> 00:29:08,040
And they had this big theory
that that could never happen and

533
00:29:08,040 --> 00:29:10,600
it did happen and it was a
disaster.

534
00:29:10,600 --> 00:29:14,440
And they reported, get this,
their second ever loss in their

535
00:29:14,440 --> 00:29:18,440
hundred year plus history,
losing $1.5 billion in 1998.

536
00:29:18,800 --> 00:29:20,760
I mean, it's a credit to them
that that's only their second

537
00:29:20,760 --> 00:29:23,640
loss.
But it all came at the wrong

538
00:29:23,640 --> 00:29:27,400
time for for BHB.
God, it's, it's, it's alarming

539
00:29:27,400 --> 00:29:29,680
when you talk about these points
in history and you're like,

540
00:29:29,680 --> 00:29:32,880
shit, imagine if that happened
now, which it could like it's

541
00:29:32,880 --> 00:29:35,360
great because it's happened and
it does happen that you just

542
00:29:35,360 --> 00:29:37,040
never think it's possible, just
like them.

543
00:29:37,200 --> 00:29:40,280
Yeah, I mean think about how
quickly this one unravelled.

544
00:29:40,280 --> 00:29:45,280
550, $1,000,000 in write offs
within a year, like within one

545
00:29:45,280 --> 00:29:48,480
year of having a mine in 1998,
just two years after the deal

546
00:29:48,600 --> 00:29:51,080
had been announced, they wrote
off nearly a billion dollars

547
00:29:51,440 --> 00:29:54,200
more.
The whole deal was completely

548
00:29:54,200 --> 00:29:58,760
written off by 1999 and
including rehab costs, the, you

549
00:29:58,760 --> 00:30:01,040
know, the the losses far
exceeded what they initially

550
00:30:01,040 --> 00:30:03,680
paid.
We're talking over US $4 billion

551
00:30:04,080 --> 00:30:06,080
on this.
The, the operations were never

552
00:30:06,200 --> 00:30:09,440
profitable for any sustained
period at all.

553
00:30:09,960 --> 00:30:12,720
And very unfortunately, it led
to an enormous amount of layoffs

554
00:30:12,760 --> 00:30:17,120
and kind of obliterated the the
community there in Arizona.

555
00:30:17,800 --> 00:30:21,200
And as you'd expect, it led to a
fair bit of animosity toward

556
00:30:21,480 --> 00:30:25,400
BHB.
By 2003, the BHB closed the

557
00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:28,960
Sandman Well copper smelter,
which was the the crown jewel

558
00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:32,080
and that ended A50 year history
of, of operating there.

559
00:30:32,080 --> 00:30:34,400
So there's a bit of a silver
lining though.

560
00:30:34,920 --> 00:30:37,920
They did manage to sell during
the next copper up cycle in the

561
00:30:37,920 --> 00:30:42,280
China boom, the entire copper
project, the US $700 million.

562
00:30:42,880 --> 00:30:46,280
This was sold to Xstrata and
came with anti Pacquia, which

563
00:30:46,440 --> 00:30:48,640
people will know is a big
producing asset for Glencore

564
00:30:48,640 --> 00:30:50,360
now.
So that wasn't being mined at

565
00:30:50,360 --> 00:30:51,640
the time of those 10 kilometers
away.

566
00:30:52,440 --> 00:30:55,560
Pinto Valley was sold to
Capstone Copper a long time

567
00:30:55,560 --> 00:30:58,560
later with all its liabilities
for US $650 million.

568
00:30:59,080 --> 00:31:02,240
But we're talking nearly two
decades after the deal at that

569
00:31:02,240 --> 00:31:06,400
point in time and BH BS
ownership in resolution copper

570
00:31:06,400 --> 00:31:10,240
also comes out of this.
So people thinking maybe sooner

571
00:31:10,240 --> 00:31:11,840
or later that gets put into
production.

572
00:31:11,840 --> 00:31:16,640
But as it stands it's been 20
plus years and billions sunk

573
00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:20,400
into that one.
So the pay off from back then is

574
00:31:20,800 --> 00:31:22,120
it's not a bit you'd want to
take.

575
00:31:23,120 --> 00:31:26,320
So so is resolution below the
old.

576
00:31:26,680 --> 00:31:29,720
Kind of, yeah.
Yeah, Yeah, yeah, right.

577
00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:31,680
Yeah, I think, I think I put a
map somewhere.

578
00:31:31,680 --> 00:31:33,680
It's they're all in that kind of
area.

579
00:31:33,840 --> 00:31:35,240
Resolution is deep.
Yeah, yeah.

580
00:31:35,480 --> 00:31:38,720
So it's in the in the same
ballpark and a few of these

581
00:31:38,720 --> 00:31:42,080
assets change names over time,
which like, infuriated me like

582
00:31:42,080 --> 00:31:43,840
crazy research.
Imagine.

583
00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:46,960
Yeah.
So on the management side of

584
00:31:46,960 --> 00:31:50,800
things, you've got the the
chairman and the CEO both

585
00:31:50,800 --> 00:31:54,880
leaving not long after the deal.
And then as as they put it in

586
00:31:54,880 --> 00:31:57,120
BHP history, they've got the
dynamic duo.

587
00:31:57,200 --> 00:31:59,440
These two Americans, Paul
Anderson and Chip Goodyear came

588
00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:04,640
in, each had a stint as CEO.
Chip was CFO to start with.

589
00:32:05,320 --> 00:32:06,840
They immediately just went on
this program.

590
00:32:06,840 --> 00:32:09,720
They sold about 30 different
assets, raised a bunch of money,

591
00:32:09,720 --> 00:32:13,400
a bunch of other board members
got let go at the same time or

592
00:32:13,400 --> 00:32:17,280
sort of made to to resign.
So this was a hugely influential

593
00:32:17,280 --> 00:32:21,520
period for the BHB and really
changed the mindset from being a

594
00:32:22,280 --> 00:32:25,800
kind of Melbourne based company
to a global company with these

595
00:32:25,800 --> 00:32:27,480
Americans coming in and running
the show.

596
00:32:27,480 --> 00:32:30,920
And company's been quite, quite
different since, you know

597
00:32:31,080 --> 00:32:35,120
between the Magma deal and the
Port Headland disaster, they

598
00:32:35,120 --> 00:32:40,560
lost nearly $7 billion.
So BHP was a less than $20

599
00:32:40,560 --> 00:32:43,400
billion company at the time.
So these were very significant

600
00:32:43,400 --> 00:32:47,680
sums.
And what comes out the back of

601
00:32:47,680 --> 00:32:50,960
this in sort of early in 2000,
2001 time is that they do the

602
00:32:50,960 --> 00:32:56,320
deal with Billiton and that is
done at a a much friendlier

603
00:32:56,320 --> 00:32:59,040
ratio to Billiton than it would
have otherwise been done.

604
00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:02,480
And they not had all these
disasters and Billiton didn't

605
00:33:02,480 --> 00:33:06,640
have great assets, but their
management team came in and and

606
00:33:06,640 --> 00:33:08,080
ran BHB.
Afterwards.

607
00:33:08,760 --> 00:33:11,880
So that's, that's So what, what
did Billiton get as a proportion

608
00:33:11,880 --> 00:33:14,680
of the the pro forma when, when
that deal was ultimately done?

609
00:33:15,080 --> 00:33:18,440
I don't want to say 34%.
Yeah, that sounds, that sounds

610
00:33:18,480 --> 00:33:21,920
familiar.
So even though this deal didn't

611
00:33:21,920 --> 00:33:24,480
come with dilution like the last
one, the impact was still

612
00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:26,800
horribly dilutionary to
shareholders because the

613
00:33:26,800 --> 00:33:30,480
ultimate share for existing BHP
shareholders of the pro forma

614
00:33:30,480 --> 00:33:33,360
BHP Billiton was, yeah,
substantially reduced.

615
00:33:33,360 --> 00:33:34,840
Whacked em.
Yeah.

616
00:33:35,400 --> 00:33:37,080
Wow, that was a juicy one.
Yeah.

617
00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:39,280
And like, what did the share
price look like in this time?

618
00:33:40,560 --> 00:33:44,560
It it fluctuates a lot.
So we go from like 20 bucks in

619
00:33:44,560 --> 00:33:51,040
sort of 98 to 2000 period.
It's $8 at a time, it bounces

620
00:33:51,040 --> 00:33:55,440
around a lot.
And then 2001 two 3-4 kick in

621
00:33:55,640 --> 00:33:59,560
China and it's it's blue skies.
Happy days to everyone.

622
00:34:00,480 --> 00:34:03,840
Yeah.
A quick break to talk about M&A

623
00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:07,360
at Kay Drew, because why
wouldn't you think of the M&A

624
00:34:07,400 --> 00:34:10,639
that happened when they bought
Ron O'Sullivan?

625
00:34:11,600 --> 00:34:14,719
Was he for sale?
I, well, I, I compare Ron

626
00:34:14,719 --> 00:34:16,840
O'Sullivan because I don't know
if he was or he wasn't.

627
00:34:17,239 --> 00:34:21,159
He's voices by voices by the
bloody, the big competition that

628
00:34:21,159 --> 00:34:23,960
Robert Friedland got going for
that nickel asset that was

629
00:34:23,960 --> 00:34:26,440
probably going on in the
background for Ron O'Sullivan.

630
00:34:26,800 --> 00:34:28,400
Cadrill have come up with the
goods.

631
00:34:28,679 --> 00:34:30,639
And what's Ron brought to
Cadrill?

632
00:34:31,000 --> 00:34:34,560
The bloody sample management,
the drill budget management,

633
00:34:34,880 --> 00:34:38,440
everyone wants to work for him
and this was all happening

634
00:34:38,440 --> 00:34:40,480
before we even started talking
about him.

635
00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:44,760
A legend of the drilling
industry and he is a great M and

636
00:34:44,760 --> 00:34:48,800
I play by K Drill.
The Voices Bay of exploration,

637
00:34:48,800 --> 00:34:50,239
drill, exploration.
I see drilling.

638
00:34:50,239 --> 00:34:51,880
He's right.
Still going good.

639
00:34:51,880 --> 00:34:53,360
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
That's all right.

640
00:34:54,719 --> 00:34:56,440
It's more, it's more the bidding
war, right?

641
00:34:56,440 --> 00:34:58,280
People were just tripping over,
weren't they?

642
00:34:58,280 --> 00:35:00,000
Maybe they were tripping over to
get a piece of.

643
00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:02,920
Him but the voices by still
going in a depressed nickel

644
00:35:02,920 --> 00:35:04,920
environment.
So that shows how good Ron

645
00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:06,960
O'Sullivan is effectively.
Why wouldn't you want to trip

646
00:35:06,960 --> 00:35:09,080
over yourself and try and get
hold of Ryan O'Sullivan to drill

647
00:35:09,080 --> 00:35:11,240
some holes for you?
Trip over him while he's

648
00:35:11,240 --> 00:35:13,400
drilling the holes with his
bare, bloody hands.

649
00:35:13,480 --> 00:35:14,480
Right.
OK, drill.

650
00:35:14,480 --> 00:35:16,640
Let's get back to the JD
Spectacular.

651
00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:20,520
Very good, right?
I wouldn't have picked this was

652
00:35:20,520 --> 00:35:23,360
#3 just because it's the one
that seems to get talked about

653
00:35:23,360 --> 00:35:25,400
the most.
Yeah, and this is probably what

654
00:35:25,400 --> 00:35:27,320
sparked my interest in doing
this kind of episode.

655
00:35:27,320 --> 00:35:29,800
Maddie Rio Tinto buys
Riversdale.

656
00:35:30,720 --> 00:35:32,840
Right.
So got Riversdale.

657
00:35:32,840 --> 00:35:35,760
On the one hand, this is a
company created by a well known

658
00:35:35,760 --> 00:35:38,840
operator, Michael O'Keefe and a
few others that were the sort of

659
00:35:38,840 --> 00:35:41,480
founders there.
They're the proud owners of a

660
00:35:41,520 --> 00:35:47,240
65% interest in Bengal coal.
They also own the Zambezi

661
00:35:47,320 --> 00:35:49,160
project as well, which is very
close.

662
00:35:49,160 --> 00:35:52,600
I'll show on a map here Benga
Stage 1, which is under

663
00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:54,480
construction at this point in
time.

664
00:35:55,160 --> 00:35:57,280
It's targeting a bit over 5
million tons per annum.

665
00:35:57,800 --> 00:36:03,280
Coal production stages two and
three are targeting a further

666
00:36:03,280 --> 00:36:05,720
roughly 15, so they'll take them
up to 20 million tons.

667
00:36:06,080 --> 00:36:09,600
Those two stages are PFS.
Then you've got the Zambezi

668
00:36:09,600 --> 00:36:12,440
conceptual mine, which is, you
know, just blue sky.

669
00:36:12,440 --> 00:36:15,960
I meant to add over 40 million
tons per annum to the profile to

670
00:36:15,960 --> 00:36:20,400
really beef it out.
This is all in the Motis Basin

671
00:36:20,440 --> 00:36:24,080
in Mozambique, which will make a
lot more sense if you look at

672
00:36:24,080 --> 00:36:27,720
the map there.
The Bengar project reportedly

673
00:36:27,720 --> 00:36:31,640
held 14 billion tons of hard
cooking coal at a time when

674
00:36:32,000 --> 00:36:34,680
cooking coal was fetching record
prices.

675
00:36:35,680 --> 00:36:37,760
That was to do with China and
everything.

676
00:36:37,760 --> 00:36:41,640
But you also had this flood in
the in the bond basin, which was

677
00:36:42,600 --> 00:36:44,760
giving a bit of a supply shock
to the market.

678
00:36:45,280 --> 00:36:49,120
So to round out the interests,
you've got Tata Steel, who will

679
00:36:49,120 --> 00:36:52,120
play a key role.
They own the other 35% of the

680
00:36:52,120 --> 00:36:55,880
operations.
They also own 26% of Riversdale

681
00:36:55,880 --> 00:36:57,880
stock.
They're very key in this

682
00:36:57,880 --> 00:36:59,920
takeover battle.
And you've also got this

683
00:36:59,920 --> 00:37:04,080
Brazilian group CSN, they own a
bit under 20%.

684
00:37:04,440 --> 00:37:08,840
So Riversdale, here's a fun
fact, also owned an operating

685
00:37:08,840 --> 00:37:13,880
asset that produced 700,000 tons
per annum in South Africa.

686
00:37:14,400 --> 00:37:16,880
This was the asset that was
bought by none other than Vu

687
00:37:16,880 --> 00:37:20,360
Slate, who we just interviewed
in in South Africa.

688
00:37:20,480 --> 00:37:22,840
Yeah, so he buys this one off
Rio in due course.

689
00:37:23,560 --> 00:37:26,200
So it all comes together.
Oh, there you go, you added that

690
00:37:26,200 --> 00:37:28,800
bit in after the Indava trip.
Well, I had that in there and

691
00:37:28,800 --> 00:37:30,800
then I added the name I was.
Like, oh, that's you.

692
00:37:32,240 --> 00:37:37,200
It all came together.
So the deal itself, it's a a bit

693
00:37:37,200 --> 00:37:39,600
of a Christmas present.
December 23rd, 2010.

694
00:37:40,440 --> 00:37:43,520
Wow.
Riversdale shareholders get, you

695
00:37:43,520 --> 00:37:44,960
know, under the gift of all
gifts.

696
00:37:44,960 --> 00:37:47,360
They'd been speculation building
for some time.

697
00:37:47,360 --> 00:37:49,920
And you'll see in the share
price chart that I'll show you

698
00:37:49,920 --> 00:37:52,320
here what it had kind of done to
the stock.

699
00:37:52,840 --> 00:37:56,200
It was revealed in I think April
of that year that Rio's head of

700
00:37:56,200 --> 00:38:00,920
energy recommended to the board
that they should try and acquire

701
00:38:01,160 --> 00:38:05,880
Mozambique coal assets with
obviously these guys, Riversdale

702
00:38:05,880 --> 00:38:10,440
being the key kind of company in
that area that was playable.

703
00:38:11,240 --> 00:38:15,720
Rio agreed a $16.00 share price
valuing the the fully diluted

704
00:38:15,720 --> 00:38:22,920
equity at Aussie $3.9 billion,
so a 46% premium to the

705
00:38:22,960 --> 00:38:25,240
undisturbed V WAP on this
company.

706
00:38:25,240 --> 00:38:30,040
And this was Rio's biggest deal
since Alcan in the takeover

707
00:38:30,040 --> 00:38:32,520
announcement.
You've got them sort of saying

708
00:38:32,520 --> 00:38:35,480
that the Benga project is
expected to commence coal

709
00:38:35,480 --> 00:38:41,120
production in September 2011 and
Zambezi would start sometime

710
00:38:41,120 --> 00:38:43,840
after 2014.
Gotcha.

711
00:38:43,840 --> 00:38:47,600
So they're, they're thinking
we're buying this with nine

712
00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:50,000
months left to, to production.
Yeah.

713
00:38:50,000 --> 00:38:52,360
This thing's in construction and
it's going to be producing coal

714
00:38:52,600 --> 00:38:55,120
very soon and we're going to
start to bear fruit on this

715
00:38:55,120 --> 00:38:57,920
price tag because it's a Ripper
coal pricing environment.

716
00:38:58,800 --> 00:39:02,880
The deal wasn't done though.
So by March of 2011, Rio had to

717
00:39:02,880 --> 00:39:05,960
up their bid by $0.50 to 16
bucks 50.

718
00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:08,680
They said that's as high as we
go and this takes it a bit over

719
00:39:09,360 --> 00:39:12,840
a billion dollars EV of $3.5
billion.

720
00:39:12,840 --> 00:39:16,280
Given those about 500 million in
cash on the company to fund the

721
00:39:16,280 --> 00:39:20,040
rest of their construction.
Rio went unconditional and it's

722
00:39:20,040 --> 00:39:23,840
then trying to win out with Tata
Steel as well as that other

723
00:39:23,840 --> 00:39:27,200
group, CSN.
And in due course, they get

724
00:39:27,200 --> 00:39:30,640
there, they get CSN over the
line 1st and then it takes about

725
00:39:30,640 --> 00:39:33,360
half a year from when they first
announce it, but they take the

726
00:39:33,360 --> 00:39:36,440
stake off Tata, who didn't want
to be part of this without a

727
00:39:36,440 --> 00:39:38,520
sort of proper JV structure to
it.

728
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:42,080
So they just sell into it.
And Rio put in place this

729
00:39:42,080 --> 00:39:45,520
strategic objective, 25,000,000
tons per annum of hard cooking

730
00:39:45,520 --> 00:39:48,000
coal by 2020.
So a bit of a ways down the

731
00:39:48,000 --> 00:39:50,520
track, but that's what they're
striving for.

732
00:39:51,280 --> 00:39:54,720
Are they, are they thinking, you
know, we're seeing this enormous

733
00:39:55,440 --> 00:39:59,080
growth of demand for our iron
ore coming out of the Pilbara.

734
00:39:59,080 --> 00:40:02,560
We, we need, we need to beef up
our high cooking coal portfolio

735
00:40:02,560 --> 00:40:05,320
to, to, to match that.
And and you know, we'll have,

736
00:40:05,760 --> 00:40:07,880
we'll be supplying all of the,
all the things that go into this

737
00:40:08,080 --> 00:40:10,160
huge steel demand.
Yeah, In a nutshell, they have

738
00:40:10,160 --> 00:40:12,760
this strategy of just servicing
China.

739
00:40:13,080 --> 00:40:18,280
And previously that strategy had
been aluminium, iron ore,

740
00:40:18,640 --> 00:40:23,520
copper, and then yeah, coal gets
added to to the piece to to fill

741
00:40:23,520 --> 00:40:27,480
out that growing demand profile
and be in the next hot basin for

742
00:40:27,480 --> 00:40:30,240
for coal Mozambique.
So what could go wrong here

743
00:40:30,240 --> 00:40:32,280
mate?
A lot of things could go wrong

744
00:40:32,280 --> 00:40:36,560
in this case, so the commodity
price wasn't super friendly as

745
00:40:36,560 --> 00:40:39,000
you'd kind of suspect given it
was at record highs.

746
00:40:39,360 --> 00:40:42,960
But it was the assets themselves
in this case and the the kind of

747
00:40:43,680 --> 00:40:47,320
DDI don't want to be too hard
and say that the lack of DD

748
00:40:47,320 --> 00:40:51,640
because they they were suspect
of the numbers that had been put

749
00:40:51,640 --> 00:40:55,360
to market by Riversdale.
And you also find out from all

750
00:40:55,360 --> 00:41:00,160
these court documents later that
it wasn't universal love of this

751
00:41:00,160 --> 00:41:03,320
deal within Rio Tinto.
Not every voice was probably

752
00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:06,760
heard to as it may have, you
know, as it probably should have

753
00:41:06,760 --> 00:41:09,240
been.
But it's not as if everyone

754
00:41:09,240 --> 00:41:10,640
loved it.
But at the end of the day,

755
00:41:10,640 --> 00:41:12,840
that's kind of how deals always
end up happening in a big

756
00:41:12,840 --> 00:41:14,480
company.
You don't tend to have everyone

757
00:41:14,480 --> 00:41:16,960
on board.
Look at these maps here.

758
00:41:16,960 --> 00:41:19,600
And this is where it gets
really, really interesting and

759
00:41:19,600 --> 00:41:23,320
how it just didn't stack up from
a logistical kind of sense.

760
00:41:23,760 --> 00:41:26,640
The project lay a few 100
kilometers inland along the

761
00:41:26,640 --> 00:41:30,000
Zambezi River.
Now you've got this one railway

762
00:41:30,000 --> 00:41:33,320
line which is meant to take it
to this port a bit under 600

763
00:41:33,320 --> 00:41:36,280
kilometers.
This had 5 million tons per

764
00:41:36,280 --> 00:41:38,280
annum capacity.
This was meant to fully service

765
00:41:38,280 --> 00:41:41,480
Stage 1.
Riversdale at the time were just

766
00:41:41,480 --> 00:41:43,560
rehabilitating this track.
They weren't actually building

767
00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:45,360
it new.
It had been a historic track.

768
00:41:45,880 --> 00:41:49,120
You've then got this other one
going in a slightly different

769
00:41:49,120 --> 00:41:52,040
direction, a longer route, 900
kilometers.

770
00:41:52,040 --> 00:41:54,640
This one's meant to run through
Malawi, which makes it a bit

771
00:41:54,640 --> 00:41:57,280
more complex.
And now this is what valet who

772
00:41:57,280 --> 00:42:00,280
were neighbors there used for
their operations.

773
00:42:00,960 --> 00:42:03,320
That had a few challenges with
it.

774
00:42:04,120 --> 00:42:06,520
But here's the big one and the
kind of most eye-catching one.

775
00:42:06,960 --> 00:42:10,640
They wanted to barge a
tremendous amount of coal down

776
00:42:10,640 --> 00:42:13,360
the river.
So this would be a 520 kilometer

777
00:42:13,760 --> 00:42:17,360
trip to the coast.
Riversdale had been testing

778
00:42:17,360 --> 00:42:18,120
this.
This was part of their

779
00:42:18,120 --> 00:42:20,880
feasibility studies for stage 2
and stage 3.

780
00:42:22,080 --> 00:42:26,120
The the deal assumed that they
would in time be able to would

781
00:42:26,120 --> 00:42:30,600
be able to barge 30 million tons
per annum down the Zambezi.

782
00:42:31,200 --> 00:42:33,440
And everyone that anyone that's
kind of seen the Zambezi can see

783
00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:36,520
it's a massive, massive
following river.

784
00:42:37,040 --> 00:42:41,000
But that is an enormous amount
to be barging any river.

785
00:42:41,000 --> 00:42:44,720
So yeah, that was a very big
assumption.

786
00:42:44,720 --> 00:42:47,400
And added on top of that they
wanted to be railing 12 to

787
00:42:47,400 --> 00:42:51,320
15,000,000 tons down the track.
This is sort of twenty 20s time

788
00:42:51,320 --> 00:42:52,320
frame that they're putting on
that.

789
00:42:52,720 --> 00:42:57,840
But yeah, that's sort of check
one on the big assumptions. 2

790
00:42:58,160 --> 00:42:59,880
was the quality of the coal
itself.

791
00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:05,080
So they assumed about 60% would
be hard cooking coal, and that

792
00:43:05,080 --> 00:43:09,080
didn't pan out either.
So this timeline starts slipping

793
00:43:09,080 --> 00:43:12,240
very soon after the deal.
It went from being that

794
00:43:12,240 --> 00:43:17,160
September 2011 quarter to
December to March by the first

795
00:43:17,160 --> 00:43:20,040
half of that year, 2012.
Now they just need to get

796
00:43:20,040 --> 00:43:23,600
something on a rail cart and get
it out so that they can say

797
00:43:23,600 --> 00:43:27,560
they've met first production.
But you know, the it's in the

798
00:43:27,560 --> 00:43:29,800
detail here.
Efficient transportation is a

799
00:43:29,800 --> 00:43:31,040
priority.
The front page of that

800
00:43:31,040 --> 00:43:34,400
announcement, they knew things
weren't going well on that front

801
00:43:35,720 --> 00:43:38,880
into the next quarter.
So we're in late 2012 now.

802
00:43:39,600 --> 00:43:43,440
The railway continues to be a
bottleneck at the end of that

803
00:43:43,440 --> 00:43:46,240
year, the final quarter, it's
still just 100,000 tons.

804
00:43:46,240 --> 00:43:48,440
That's nowhere near what it
should be.

805
00:43:49,520 --> 00:43:53,040
And then bang, you get this
massive bombshell that Rio drops

806
00:43:54,400 --> 00:43:56,720
after providing, to be honest,
pretty scant information.

807
00:43:56,720 --> 00:43:59,600
You're able to do that when you
Rio Tinto on the actual state of

808
00:43:59,600 --> 00:44:04,120
the operations for most of 2012,
they come out and say Rio

809
00:44:04,120 --> 00:44:07,920
expects to recognize 3 billion
U.S. dollar impairment on

810
00:44:07,920 --> 00:44:11,120
Mozambique coal.
This is less than 18 months

811
00:44:11,440 --> 00:44:15,400
after the deal was wrapped.
And what they pay for they pay 4

812
00:44:15,400 --> 00:44:16,680
billion ish.
Wow.

813
00:44:17,240 --> 00:44:19,320
Then pass your working capital
and.

814
00:44:19,360 --> 00:44:21,600
And they sunk a shit load of
money into that thing.

815
00:44:21,720 --> 00:44:27,240
Like, yeah, so obviously that
that wasn't all, just everything

816
00:44:27,240 --> 00:44:29,400
going wrong at the operational
side.

817
00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:32,160
You had the commodity price,
which forces the impairments

818
00:44:32,160 --> 00:44:35,040
often, and you have to reassess
it against your carrying value.

819
00:44:35,760 --> 00:44:38,240
But they admitted that the
development of the

820
00:44:38,240 --> 00:44:41,120
infrastructure to support the
coal was way more challenging

821
00:44:41,120 --> 00:44:43,560
than they had originally
anticipated.

822
00:44:43,960 --> 00:44:47,040
And to cap it off, they hadn't
even got approvals to barge

823
00:44:47,040 --> 00:44:49,560
anything.
So even if it was feasible,

824
00:44:49,720 --> 00:44:54,280
which it wasn't, to barge 10
million tons down, the

825
00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:56,160
government was saying, no,
you're not doing it.

826
00:44:56,760 --> 00:45:00,840
So this leads to a whole bunch
of headaches because Rio knew

827
00:45:00,840 --> 00:45:02,840
about this way before they told
the market.

828
00:45:03,160 --> 00:45:06,880
You got the Rio VP of logistics
believing that the absolute

829
00:45:06,880 --> 00:45:09,800
limit they could potentially do
would be 10 million tons while

830
00:45:09,800 --> 00:45:12,160
they're talking about this up to
30 kind of number.

831
00:45:12,840 --> 00:45:15,760
And you've got yeah,
hydrogeological constraints and

832
00:45:15,760 --> 00:45:19,800
a whole other, a whole box of
other constraints physically

833
00:45:19,800 --> 00:45:21,320
that would stop you from doing
so.

834
00:45:21,400 --> 00:45:26,360
So to to put the boot in, they
they say that the reserves far

835
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:28,680
less than what their DD had even
estimated.

836
00:45:29,200 --> 00:45:32,880
And if you think that their DD
had estimated reserves being

837
00:45:32,880 --> 00:45:36,880
half of what Riversdale had put
out as reserves, you get a a

838
00:45:36,880 --> 00:45:40,360
relatively small number.
And again, that quality of coal

839
00:45:40,360 --> 00:45:42,600
was less than anticipated as
well.

840
00:45:42,840 --> 00:45:46,720
So a year later you get another
half a billion dollar US write

841
00:45:46,720 --> 00:45:48,320
down.
Jesus.

842
00:45:48,320 --> 00:45:49,000
Disaster.
So.

843
00:45:49,080 --> 00:45:51,360
So what were the final numbers
of what the reserves actually

844
00:45:51,360 --> 00:45:54,720
were?
They they came in at about 3

845
00:45:54,720 --> 00:45:58,200
billion.
Jesus and Riversdale had claimed

846
00:45:58,200 --> 00:45:59,480
13.
Yes.

847
00:46:00,760 --> 00:46:04,160
Yeah, that's nasty.
It's in the the logistics

848
00:46:04,160 --> 00:46:06,040
constraint.
So they're they were trying to

849
00:46:06,040 --> 00:46:09,360
refurb an old grail.
Did that just prove to be like

850
00:46:09,560 --> 00:46:13,760
impossible to to do to to the
capacity that they wanted?

851
00:46:13,760 --> 00:46:16,720
Yeah, to the capacity they they
wanted, they couldn't, they

852
00:46:16,720 --> 00:46:21,160
couldn't get there, but it just
wasn't economic to do it.

853
00:46:21,280 --> 00:46:23,320
At the end of the day.
They could have if they sunk

854
00:46:23,760 --> 00:46:26,600
even more money, but with the
commodity price falling off with

855
00:46:26,600 --> 00:46:31,000
the coal not really being there.
Because coal then embarks on

856
00:46:31,000 --> 00:46:35,400
this like decade, almost decade
long trend of just going like

857
00:46:35,440 --> 00:46:38,040
lower and lower and lower.
Yeah, Yeah.

858
00:46:38,040 --> 00:46:40,840
Look, you can see this chart.
I'll, I'll, I'll Chuck in.

859
00:46:41,640 --> 00:46:45,640
It's to the commodity lows at
early 2016, just a one way sort

860
00:46:45,640 --> 00:46:49,960
of straight, which is not good
for anyone involved in the

861
00:46:49,960 --> 00:46:52,920
industry at that point in time.
Jesus, look at a gal off in

862
00:46:53,560 --> 00:46:55,440
2017.
But that's unbelievable.

863
00:46:55,560 --> 00:47:00,280
Yeah, yeah.
Talk a bit about the the

864
00:47:00,280 --> 00:47:03,440
Riversdale sellers who who did
quite well so.

865
00:47:03,440 --> 00:47:05,400
What was the fallout from it,
JD?

866
00:47:05,560 --> 00:47:09,080
So obviously got the impairments
that looks pretty rough.

867
00:47:09,080 --> 00:47:12,120
They ended up selling the assets
in 2014, just a few years later

868
00:47:12,120 --> 00:47:16,200
for 50 million bucks.
Wow. 2016 they sell that South

869
00:47:16,200 --> 00:47:17,920
African operation that was
undisclosed.

870
00:47:18,920 --> 00:47:20,560
What happens to the the
Riversdale guys?

871
00:47:20,560 --> 00:47:24,440
You've got O'Keefe merge this
business merged a business

872
00:47:24,440 --> 00:47:26,320
rather, and chaired Champion
Iron.

873
00:47:26,320 --> 00:47:29,000
So he's doing quite well for
himself these days.

874
00:47:29,480 --> 00:47:32,080
They picked up a sort of
reincarnation.

875
00:47:32,080 --> 00:47:34,040
They could have called it
Riversdale again.

876
00:47:34,040 --> 00:47:36,400
They picked up Grassy Mountain,
which they sold to Gina for 600

877
00:47:36,400 --> 00:47:38,680
million bucks, 2019.
A few people might remember that

878
00:47:38,680 --> 00:47:42,720
one, but here's a cracking quote
from one of the other founders

879
00:47:42,720 --> 00:47:45,120
of Riversdale.
We were a company with 500

880
00:47:45,120 --> 00:47:49,120
million bucks in cash at rail
port wagons, and the mine was

881
00:47:49,120 --> 00:47:51,280
already developed.
The wash plant was going and

882
00:47:51,280 --> 00:47:58,120
they still managed to screw it.
Yeah, Rio paid a heap of

883
00:47:58,400 --> 00:48:01,160
different settlements with the
SSA, with people in London, with

884
00:48:01,200 --> 00:48:05,040
ASIC as well for their lack of
disclosure and hence a lot of

885
00:48:05,040 --> 00:48:08,440
info came out of this deal
because of all the court orders.

886
00:48:08,440 --> 00:48:10,280
So that was very interesting to
kind of read into.

887
00:48:10,360 --> 00:48:14,720
But there was this kind of one
bit where the internal technical

888
00:48:14,720 --> 00:48:17,520
team is starting to run the
numbers, I think only in 2012,

889
00:48:17,520 --> 00:48:23,440
and they come up with a negative
300 million to like -5 negative

890
00:48:23,440 --> 00:48:27,920
5 billion NPV for the project a
year or so after they bought it.

891
00:48:28,160 --> 00:48:32,880
So there's a tense emails sent
around as you were able to read

892
00:48:32,880 --> 00:48:36,480
a bit later.
It must have been, yeah, like a

893
00:48:37,240 --> 00:48:40,480
a real hard look at yourself
internally at A, at a company's

894
00:48:40,480 --> 00:48:43,600
biggest Rio Tinto when, when
something as substantial as this

895
00:48:43,600 --> 00:48:47,400
just kind of gets across the
board approvals from a technical

896
00:48:47,400 --> 00:48:50,520
perspective.
Yeah, yeah, absolutely.

897
00:48:50,520 --> 00:48:54,560
The the CEO who was sacked and
it's kind of make more sense

898
00:48:54,560 --> 00:48:56,400
when I talk about the other
stuff, but there was a lot of

899
00:48:56,400 --> 00:48:59,680
factors going on here, said on
the Riversdale front.

900
00:48:59,680 --> 00:49:03,440
The biggest fault at his feet
was that the the resource and

901
00:49:03,440 --> 00:49:05,320
reserve didn't stack up if
you're trying to sort of piece

902
00:49:05,320 --> 00:49:08,560
together all the all the various
things that went wrong on on

903
00:49:08,560 --> 00:49:11,360
this front.
But you know, there was there

904
00:49:11,360 --> 00:49:15,920
was faults in a lot of different
parts, commodity cycle DD.

905
00:49:17,040 --> 00:49:19,680
I think the saving grace is the
relative size of this deal

906
00:49:19,920 --> 00:49:23,760
versus Rio, like Rio's booming
coming, you know, in that sort

907
00:49:23,760 --> 00:49:26,000
of 2010 period, again, like most
miners were.

908
00:49:26,280 --> 00:49:32,040
So while it was a insanely
abrupt write off it, it didn't

909
00:49:32,040 --> 00:49:34,320
kill the company by any stretch.
Obviously so, but.

910
00:49:34,640 --> 00:49:36,880
It did 'cause people to fall on
their sword.

911
00:49:37,360 --> 00:49:39,520
It did indeed.
The yeah, a lot of the

912
00:49:39,520 --> 00:49:41,520
management team were gone when
those write outs happened.

913
00:49:41,720 --> 00:49:43,800
Write downs happened.
They're right.

914
00:49:44,040 --> 00:49:48,160
God is.
So is that deposit being mined

915
00:49:49,280 --> 00:49:55,960
or did it get mined eventually?
Those deposits I want to say in

916
00:49:55,960 --> 00:50:01,680
Tata Steel's hands again, yeah,
Roller, very interesting cycle

917
00:50:01,680 --> 00:50:05,640
here, Ken, Ken Talbot, there's
very interesting history through

918
00:50:05,640 --> 00:50:09,560
the the 2000s sort of Queens and
coal magnate.

919
00:50:10,120 --> 00:50:14,240
He'd had his feet in these
assets as well and ended up kind

920
00:50:14,240 --> 00:50:16,080
of selling out a bit before a
deal deal here.

921
00:50:16,120 --> 00:50:18,080
He was a billionaire anyway, so
it didn't matter.

922
00:50:18,080 --> 00:50:22,480
But these assets had a lot of
interesting history and the

923
00:50:22,480 --> 00:50:25,040
related ones, you know, the the
tenements and what sort of

924
00:50:25,040 --> 00:50:27,200
touches on them in other parts
as well.

925
00:50:28,040 --> 00:50:32,440
A long history but not being
mine to the standard then I

926
00:50:32,440 --> 00:50:35,720
thought they would be no.
Right, it's good stuff, right?

927
00:50:36,640 --> 00:50:39,440
Deal #2 Now you probably could
have taken your pick from this

928
00:50:39,440 --> 00:50:41,960
company.
I could have, yeah.

929
00:50:41,960 --> 00:50:44,280
St.
Barbara buys Atlantic Gold deal

930
00:50:44,280 --> 00:50:47,240
#2 This is the most recent deal
on the list.

931
00:50:47,240 --> 00:50:49,280
And normally you'd want to give
it a bit more time, but I think

932
00:50:49,480 --> 00:50:51,880
sort of five or six years is
enough in this case.

933
00:50:51,880 --> 00:50:55,440
But you're quite right, Maddie.
This was a toss up between a

934
00:50:55,440 --> 00:50:59,240
2012 deal, which they did to buy
Allied Gold, which is a complete

935
00:50:59,240 --> 00:51:01,720
clanger.
That was how Siberian Gold Ridge

936
00:51:01,720 --> 00:51:05,120
came into the fold there, had a
90% premium at the top of the

937
00:51:05,120 --> 00:51:07,200
gold market, went horribly
wrong.

938
00:51:07,200 --> 00:51:11,360
But I sort of thought they
ultimately came out of that one

939
00:51:11,360 --> 00:51:15,600
and were able to have a run up
in in share price again and they

940
00:51:15,600 --> 00:51:17,920
had that experience.
They knew what doing a deal was

941
00:51:17,920 --> 00:51:19,320
like in the company.
I know there was different

942
00:51:19,320 --> 00:51:23,360
people and so on, but given
that, I thought I'd talk about

943
00:51:23,360 --> 00:51:27,200
the Atlantic 2019 deal.
So was the Goldridge, Was that

944
00:51:27,200 --> 00:51:30,920
the Solomon assets ones in the
Solomon Islands?

945
00:51:30,920 --> 00:51:33,360
Yes, yeah, yeah.
So.

946
00:51:34,280 --> 00:51:35,600
They've sort of got half of it
still.

947
00:51:35,840 --> 00:51:38,960
Yeah, Yeah, there's a, there's
long, long history as they're

948
00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:42,040
OS, ES with these assets.
So I'll give a bit of context on

949
00:51:42,040 --> 00:51:45,080
this deal.
We're going to March 2019 prior

950
00:51:45,080 --> 00:51:48,400
to the deal, St.
Barbara's kept it a bit under 2

951
00:51:48,400 --> 00:51:53,240
billion Aussie operating Gualia
and Simbiri together with those

952
00:51:53,240 --> 00:51:56,480
assets about 400,000 ounces of
production all in sustaining

953
00:51:56,480 --> 00:52:00,240
costs below 1000 bucks an ounce.
Then you've got Atlantic free

954
00:52:00,240 --> 00:52:03,080
the beard are kept under $600
million.

955
00:52:03,880 --> 00:52:07,280
They operate the Tokwo.
I'm sure I'm pronouncing that

956
00:52:07,280 --> 00:52:09,880
run wrong.
Torquay, Torquay could be could

957
00:52:09,880 --> 00:52:15,520
be in it's sort of part of the
the broader Moose River project

958
00:52:15,520 --> 00:52:19,080
in Far East Canada.
So Nova Scotia is where these

959
00:52:19,080 --> 00:52:22,600
assets sit.
Very importantly, 3 development

960
00:52:22,800 --> 00:52:26,480
stage assets are a part of this.
They play a big role because

961
00:52:26,800 --> 00:52:29,960
they were meant to come online
and they were meant to help them

962
00:52:29,960 --> 00:52:33,280
achieve economies of scale on
those and that shared

963
00:52:33,280 --> 00:52:35,000
infrastructure and pull down the
costs.

964
00:52:35,600 --> 00:52:38,760
So they were doing about 90,000
oz at the time.

965
00:52:38,760 --> 00:52:43,160
Very importantly, the company
sort of promotes 12 year mine

966
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:48,200
life when they're pitching this
deal, but that operating mine

967
00:52:48,280 --> 00:52:51,440
has only really got 3-4, five
years in it.

968
00:52:51,440 --> 00:52:54,160
So that's factoring in
everything coming on online.

969
00:52:54,880 --> 00:52:58,200
And this was not a commodity
price disaster.

970
00:52:58,480 --> 00:53:03,560
Gold is at US 1300 bucks at the
time and we all know where it is

971
00:53:03,560 --> 00:53:05,880
today so that was not what went
wrong on this front.

972
00:53:07,160 --> 00:53:09,600
Wow, so So what was the actual
deal like?

973
00:53:09,600 --> 00:53:12,800
What did it look like?
It looked like an all cash

974
00:53:13,040 --> 00:53:17,200
consideration of $770 million.
Atlantic had some debt, so the

975
00:53:17,280 --> 00:53:20,400
implied EV is about 850 million
Aussie.

976
00:53:20,400 --> 00:53:22,800
They offered a 40% premium to
get this one over the line.

977
00:53:23,400 --> 00:53:27,120
At the time they launched a
$490,000,000 capital raising, so

978
00:53:27,120 --> 00:53:30,960
they had cash reserves of 380
million and no debt going into

979
00:53:30,960 --> 00:53:34,280
the deal.
They end up signing up this $200

980
00:53:34,280 --> 00:53:37,480
million debt facility as well,
which they don't tap into just

981
00:53:37,480 --> 00:53:40,200
yet.
Atlantic directors controlled

982
00:53:40,200 --> 00:53:44,440
32% of the stock, so that helped
things get wrapped up relatively

983
00:53:44,440 --> 00:53:46,240
quickly.
It's only a bit over two months

984
00:53:46,240 --> 00:53:48,320
from the announcement to the
deal being finished.

985
00:53:49,120 --> 00:53:52,320
What they thought they were kind
of getting into was low cost

986
00:53:52,480 --> 00:53:55,200
operation, spreading their
jurisdictional risk.

987
00:53:55,600 --> 00:53:58,680
And you know that the flavor of
the day then was Ozzy's gone to

988
00:53:58,680 --> 00:54:00,400
North America.
The answers are cheaper over

989
00:54:00,400 --> 00:54:04,040
there and we can do it better.
That's kind of the the mindset

990
00:54:04,040 --> 00:54:06,120
that not not just St.
Barbara had, but a lot of the

991
00:54:06,120 --> 00:54:09,960
miners had at the time and they
were M&A hungry.

992
00:54:09,960 --> 00:54:13,080
Like the CEO said, we have
enough to keep us busy for the

993
00:54:13,080 --> 00:54:15,560
time, but we're looking hard now
that we've got a foothold in the

994
00:54:15,560 --> 00:54:17,760
region.
They were M&A hungry and they

995
00:54:17,760 --> 00:54:21,240
wanted to do deals.
Talking about the share issue,

996
00:54:21,920 --> 00:54:25,880
they hand out this new stock at
2 bucks 89.

997
00:54:26,560 --> 00:54:29,720
It's a pretty standard discount,
but they had been trading over 5

998
00:54:29,720 --> 00:54:34,440
bucks in mid 2018.
Now it was a lot of controversy

999
00:54:34,440 --> 00:54:37,280
about this capital raising.
It did not go smoothly by any

1000
00:54:37,280 --> 00:54:39,880
stretch.
So St.

1001
00:54:39,880 --> 00:54:43,280
Barbara actually ended up
allowing the retail component of

1002
00:54:43,280 --> 00:54:46,240
that to withdraw their bids
because they had a production

1003
00:54:46,240 --> 00:54:48,800
downgrade during the time frame.
So the instant money has been

1004
00:54:48,800 --> 00:54:53,200
taken on board, you've got 130
odd $1,000,000 raise going to

1005
00:54:53,200 --> 00:54:55,000
retail.
Most of them are put the bids in

1006
00:54:55,480 --> 00:54:58,640
and they end up saying how you
can pull them.

1007
00:54:58,880 --> 00:55:00,920
Of course, pretty much everyone
does because at this point

1008
00:55:00,920 --> 00:55:03,440
they're trading well below the
the issue price.

1009
00:55:04,200 --> 00:55:06,720
You got Deutsche Bank as the the
underwriter here.

1010
00:55:06,720 --> 00:55:10,600
And as they tend to do, they've
got a bunch of hedge funds being

1011
00:55:10,600 --> 00:55:13,880
the sub underwriters.
That's very commonplace, but

1012
00:55:14,200 --> 00:55:17,160
it's not so common for it to go
so, so badly wrong.

1013
00:55:17,160 --> 00:55:22,200
A. 135 million bucks is that
retail component, yeah, which is

1014
00:55:22,200 --> 00:55:25,920
underwater.
So about two bucks 89 and the

1015
00:55:25,920 --> 00:55:30,400
stock's trading like 2:50-ish.
So pretty much every retail bid

1016
00:55:30,440 --> 00:55:34,680
was scrapped as you'd imagine,
meaning Deutsche Bank and the

1017
00:55:34,680 --> 00:55:38,400
sub underwriters were on the
hook for $130 million, so they

1018
00:55:38,400 --> 00:55:41,960
had to give that to the company.
And for some unrelated

1019
00:55:41,960 --> 00:55:44,400
interesting history, this will
happen in the same week that

1020
00:55:44,760 --> 00:55:48,800
Daisian lost over 70% of its
market value and gas going went

1021
00:55:48,800 --> 00:55:51,840
into VA.
So there was a lot going on in

1022
00:55:51,840 --> 00:55:54,480
in that week in the gold market.
Holy shit.

1023
00:55:54,880 --> 00:55:56,560
The gold price actually
rebounded.

1024
00:55:56,560 --> 00:55:59,280
So I don't, I don't know what
sort of loss the underwriter and

1025
00:55:59,280 --> 00:56:01,600
sub underwriters had to take on
this, but the stock price

1026
00:56:01,600 --> 00:56:05,800
actually rebounded over the
raised price in over the next

1027
00:56:05,800 --> 00:56:09,160
sort of six month period as we
get to the end of 2019.

1028
00:56:09,160 --> 00:56:12,440
So that's a open-ended question,
which I'm sure a few people know

1029
00:56:12,440 --> 00:56:14,440
the answer to out there.
And this is like when you say

1030
00:56:14,440 --> 00:56:16,880
and look at what they were
trading at, this was all on the,

1031
00:56:16,880 --> 00:56:20,680
this was after they went down to
like $0.05 once they finally saw

1032
00:56:20,680 --> 00:56:24,080
2014 Solomon thing out like the
people that made all those

1033
00:56:24,080 --> 00:56:26,640
truckies at Gwalia that made
that much money.

1034
00:56:26,800 --> 00:56:30,680
But my share is at $0.05.
So they've recovered from all

1035
00:56:30,680 --> 00:56:33,560
that and then got up to, did you
say 5 bucks?

1036
00:56:33,560 --> 00:56:36,840
5 bucks?
Yeah, it's 100 X from those

1037
00:56:36,840 --> 00:56:39,760
lies.
And then this this deal comes

1038
00:56:39,760 --> 00:56:40,760
along.
Yeah.

1039
00:56:40,760 --> 00:56:45,440
So this deal came along, Maddie,
and it did not go well from

1040
00:56:45,440 --> 00:56:47,800
pretty soon into the into the
piece.

1041
00:56:47,800 --> 00:56:52,680
And it was a combo of financial
mistakes, operational and hugely

1042
00:56:53,320 --> 00:56:56,600
regulatory problems.
So my life was very limited at

1043
00:56:56,600 --> 00:56:57,920
that operating asset, like I
said.

1044
00:56:58,240 --> 00:57:01,560
So they had a lot riding on
those development projects and

1045
00:57:02,400 --> 00:57:04,840
they were very aware of those
problems.

1046
00:57:04,840 --> 00:57:07,160
They just thought they could
kind of handle them.

1047
00:57:08,200 --> 00:57:11,120
It was meant to be this kind of
stage transition as those assets

1048
00:57:11,120 --> 00:57:16,360
came on in 21/22/23 and took
them to 200,000 ounces in Nova

1049
00:57:16,360 --> 00:57:19,160
Scotia, but that that just
didn't happen.

1050
00:57:19,160 --> 00:57:22,800
You had huge environmental
opposition and huge regulatory

1051
00:57:22,800 --> 00:57:25,880
delays that held them back, and
then the costs blew out

1052
00:57:25,880 --> 00:57:28,760
massively.
Our calendar year 23, they were

1053
00:57:28,760 --> 00:57:32,640
meant to be producing 200,000
oz, and they did 28,000 oz.

1054
00:57:33,160 --> 00:57:35,320
So Ouch.
Yeah, it didn't.

1055
00:57:35,840 --> 00:57:38,440
It didn't kind of make the mark.
So all their fixed costs that

1056
00:57:38,440 --> 00:57:42,600
they've got at this producing
asset and clearly the minimus

1057
00:57:42,960 --> 00:57:44,120
fee.
Yeah.

1058
00:57:44,120 --> 00:57:47,480
I mean that asset went on care
and maintenance for the

1059
00:57:47,480 --> 00:57:51,480
second-half of calendar year 23.
So the last quarter of 23,

1060
00:57:51,480 --> 00:57:55,360
they're not producing anything
on this deal where about 23 as

1061
00:57:55,360 --> 00:57:57,160
well.
None of the permits had been

1062
00:57:57,160 --> 00:57:59,120
received for those development
projects.

1063
00:57:59,520 --> 00:58:03,920
So almost from the off they face
charges for not complying with

1064
00:58:04,040 --> 00:58:09,120
environmental laws that just
didn't give them a good brand.

1065
00:58:09,320 --> 00:58:11,480
You know, I'm sure they'd argue
that that wasn't true.

1066
00:58:11,480 --> 00:58:14,680
But the the perception of of
what they were doing there was

1067
00:58:15,200 --> 00:58:17,920
not backed by popular support.
And it was, you know, you need

1068
00:58:17,920 --> 00:58:20,800
your social license.
It was very tough the issues

1069
00:58:20,800 --> 00:58:22,160
that they didn't come out of the
blue.

1070
00:58:22,600 --> 00:58:24,760
The, the previous company
Atlantic had been battling with

1071
00:58:24,760 --> 00:58:28,960
these and there was this meeting
about a tailings management kind

1072
00:58:28,960 --> 00:58:31,880
of facility there.
This was after the deal was

1073
00:58:31,880 --> 00:58:35,360
announced but before it had
closed and there was this kind

1074
00:58:35,360 --> 00:58:38,240
of protest or somebody didn't
want it to go ahead kind of

1075
00:58:38,240 --> 00:58:43,400
being violently arrested as the
as the headlines rang out at the

1076
00:58:43,400 --> 00:58:44,320
time.
So.

1077
00:58:44,800 --> 00:58:47,800
My misremembering the tailings
like pumped into the ocean

1078
00:58:47,800 --> 00:58:52,800
there.
They were exploring like Tri

1079
00:58:52,800 --> 00:58:56,400
stack and every every option
that they could here.

1080
00:58:56,400 --> 00:58:58,680
I'm not specifically sure what
they were talking about in this

1081
00:58:58,680 --> 00:59:02,080
in this meeting here, but if
you've got the boss of Saint

1082
00:59:02,080 --> 00:59:04,880
Barbara saying I've got to prove
why this is a good deal.

1083
00:59:04,880 --> 00:59:07,240
So from the off they knew they
had challenges.

1084
00:59:07,240 --> 00:59:10,760
And interestingly on the the
social license, he had this

1085
00:59:10,760 --> 00:59:13,800
comment to add that sometimes a
change in owner or change of

1086
00:59:13,800 --> 00:59:16,800
management can improve projects
social license to operate.

1087
00:59:17,160 --> 00:59:19,760
So they thought that maybe them
being a different entity would

1088
00:59:19,760 --> 00:59:23,640
help the cause, which didn't
turn out to be true in the end.

1089
00:59:23,960 --> 00:59:27,200
Imagine a Canadian saying that.
I'd come in here, you know, it's

1090
00:59:27,240 --> 00:59:30,600
like, right?
Wouldn't smell good, would it?

1091
00:59:31,760 --> 00:59:35,160
So within six months, one of the
development projects, Cochrane

1092
00:59:35,160 --> 00:59:40,520
Hill, saw it included in a
designated wilderness area.

1093
00:59:40,960 --> 00:59:42,760
That is never good for something
you want to find.

1094
00:59:43,280 --> 00:59:46,640
Then you've got the financial
strain and it's kind of why I

1095
00:59:46,640 --> 00:59:49,920
ranked this deal so highly
because it was too big a deal

1096
00:59:49,920 --> 00:59:53,280
for the company to not go, well,
you can't do that big a deal

1097
00:59:53,440 --> 00:59:58,280
relative to your size and it
just go disastrously wrong,

1098
00:59:58,280 --> 01:00:01,240
right.
So from pre deal to post, St.

1099
01:00:01,240 --> 01:00:04,880
Barbara went from debt free to
nearly at with nearly $400

1100
01:00:04,880 --> 01:00:07,760
million cash to essentially
neutral.

1101
01:00:07,760 --> 01:00:12,000
So they're positive sort of
balance sheet strength is

1102
01:00:12,000 --> 01:00:14,000
completely gone when they sign
up for this deal.

1103
01:00:15,720 --> 01:00:18,800
There was already production and
cash flow at the assets in

1104
01:00:18,800 --> 01:00:21,320
Canada and that was meant to
increase, but that didn't

1105
01:00:21,320 --> 01:00:24,320
happen.
And they were signing up for

1106
01:00:24,360 --> 01:00:26,600
heavy CapEx.
So they go to neutral balance

1107
01:00:26,600 --> 01:00:28,800
sheet, right?
But you've got 3 development

1108
01:00:28,800 --> 01:00:30,880
projects that want to come
online, you need to spend a lot

1109
01:00:30,880 --> 01:00:33,800
of money and they didn't have to
spend as much as they thought

1110
01:00:33,800 --> 01:00:36,240
because the projects didn't get
the permits, but they were

1111
01:00:36,240 --> 01:00:38,440
signing up for a lot of spending
and from the off, they were

1112
01:00:38,440 --> 01:00:41,280
putting themselves in a kind of
difficult position.

1113
01:00:41,680 --> 01:00:47,320
So you know like you've got this
asset that runs for about four

1114
01:00:47,320 --> 01:00:50,120
years from operation that's
never going to pay itself off

1115
01:00:50,120 --> 01:00:54,520
especially when your growth
ambitions at 2 1/2 X that so.

1116
01:00:54,520 --> 01:00:56,640
Presumably they're bleeding cash
while this thing's operating

1117
01:00:56,640 --> 01:00:58,920
too, because it's they're just
not getting the answers required

1118
01:00:58,920 --> 01:00:59,840
to.
Yeah.

1119
01:00:59,840 --> 01:01:03,800
I mean to put the boot in Gualia
just goes from bad to worse

1120
01:01:03,800 --> 01:01:06,760
during this time frame.
So that production downgrade

1121
01:01:06,760 --> 01:01:09,840
during the deal was a Gualia 1.
And then the same thing happens

1122
01:01:09,840 --> 01:01:12,560
quarter after quarter after
quarter for a while to come.

1123
01:01:12,560 --> 01:01:17,720
So that went from producing cash
and helping them out massively

1124
01:01:18,080 --> 01:01:22,920
to being a a very big burden.
And then again, Simbiri has its

1125
01:01:22,960 --> 01:01:26,080
own downgrades and they're
running out of those, you know,

1126
01:01:26,080 --> 01:01:29,200
that oxide zone that they're,
they're mining, they're focusing

1127
01:01:29,240 --> 01:01:33,240
or looking to focus on the
sulfides that needs CapEx and

1128
01:01:33,240 --> 01:01:35,000
everything.
And you know, in the face of

1129
01:01:35,000 --> 01:01:37,720
gold just tearing higher, that
couldn't even help them.

1130
01:01:37,720 --> 01:01:40,440
There was there was so many
things going wrong at the at the

1131
01:01:40,440 --> 01:01:44,520
wrong time for this company.
Jesus Christ, so he has.

1132
01:01:46,560 --> 01:01:49,440
This is when the Saint Barbara
we sort of finished on

1133
01:01:49,720 --> 01:01:52,040
commenced, wasn't it?
It is, yeah.

1134
01:01:52,040 --> 01:01:55,240
It's, it's kind of sad to say,
at the state of the company now.

1135
01:01:55,240 --> 01:01:57,480
Yeah, right.
It went so, so disastrously

1136
01:01:57,480 --> 01:02:00,920
wrong in this case.
Reflecting on the deal years

1137
01:02:00,920 --> 01:02:05,120
later, the chair actually said
that it wasn't the DD that went

1138
01:02:05,120 --> 01:02:06,480
wrong.
Just kind of what my first

1139
01:02:06,480 --> 01:02:08,600
thoughts were.
But he sort of pointed to COVID

1140
01:02:08,600 --> 01:02:11,960
being a, a massive impact to
saying we couldn't get our boots

1141
01:02:11,960 --> 01:02:15,280
on the ground there.
You know, take that as you kind

1142
01:02:15,280 --> 01:02:19,640
of as you kind of may, you know,
can I think COVID would have

1143
01:02:19,640 --> 01:02:22,360
been a bit of a disruption, but
clearly it was a lot of things

1144
01:02:22,360 --> 01:02:24,160
that didn't go wrong in this
case.

1145
01:02:24,160 --> 01:02:26,760
And obviously speaking with the
regulatory groups, with the

1146
01:02:26,760 --> 01:02:29,440
First Nation groups, who was one
of them, but there were plenty

1147
01:02:29,440 --> 01:02:31,480
of other things that needed to
be done kind of better in this

1148
01:02:31,840 --> 01:02:34,680
this case.
This company was an ASX 200

1149
01:02:34,680 --> 01:02:39,640
constituent when the deal was
announced, trading at 3 bucks 2

1150
01:02:39,640 --> 01:02:42,960
billion plus market cap.
Still in 2020, they're at those

1151
01:02:42,960 --> 01:02:45,360
sort of highs.
And then slowly everything

1152
01:02:45,360 --> 01:02:46,840
starts to catch up with the
company.

1153
01:02:46,840 --> 01:02:51,640
In 21, they start writing down
the assets by 23, over $700

1154
01:02:51,640 --> 01:02:55,520
million in in write downs.
The asset itself is in care and

1155
01:02:55,520 --> 01:02:58,040
maintenance.
Nothing continues to drain money

1156
01:02:58,120 --> 01:03:00,080
while it's in care and
maintenance.

1157
01:03:00,880 --> 01:03:03,360
In the years up to 2019, like
you kind of spoke to there

1158
01:03:03,360 --> 01:03:07,160
Maddie, they had done a
beautiful job like 2014 to 2019

1159
01:03:07,800 --> 01:03:10,760
was like a a beautiful day
leveraging of the business.

1160
01:03:11,080 --> 01:03:12,440
They went from strength to
strength.

1161
01:03:12,680 --> 01:03:15,960
You sort of zoom out and see it
and that they were even paying

1162
01:03:15,960 --> 01:03:17,800
dividends, right?
Like things were going

1163
01:03:17,800 --> 01:03:22,680
gangbusters and then this deal
led to it all really unwinding

1164
01:03:22,680 --> 01:03:27,760
in conjunction with Gualia
becoming the kind of asset it is

1165
01:03:27,760 --> 01:03:30,920
kind of today, right?
And Simbiri challenges too.

1166
01:03:31,000 --> 01:03:36,800
So mid 2022, they've still got a
$1 billion market cap, but they

1167
01:03:36,800 --> 01:03:40,160
don't have any defense like
Genesis, which was for a long

1168
01:03:40,160 --> 01:03:43,400
time a way smaller company, is
just circling them.

1169
01:03:43,400 --> 01:03:46,160
And because they're bleeding on
all fronts, they've got no way

1170
01:03:46,160 --> 01:03:49,240
of defending themselves.
And I think everyone knows the

1171
01:03:49,280 --> 01:03:51,400
the kind of history on, on what
happens there.

1172
01:03:51,400 --> 01:03:55,400
So not completely fair to
compare share price now and then

1173
01:03:55,400 --> 01:03:58,520
because you've got that
distribution of 205,000,000

1174
01:03:59,120 --> 01:04:03,240
Genesis shares that took place.
But yeah, a lot of things went

1175
01:04:03,240 --> 01:04:05,680
wrong.
Again, the CEO left five months

1176
01:04:05,680 --> 01:04:08,560
after this deal and that was the
CEO that had taken them through

1177
01:04:08,560 --> 01:04:13,560
that awesome period like that.
It was for unrelated reasons.

1178
01:04:13,560 --> 01:04:16,000
And I'm not sure what he could
sort of see into the Atlantic

1179
01:04:16,000 --> 01:04:20,120
deal five months later.
But yeah, that left the board

1180
01:04:20,600 --> 01:04:24,240
where not a single member had
more than $300,000 in stock.

1181
01:04:24,240 --> 01:04:28,680
Yeah, well, at that time.
So, you know, when you when you

1182
01:04:28,680 --> 01:04:33,120
think about incentives like we
we often do, it's, it's a tough

1183
01:04:33,120 --> 01:04:36,480
one for a company that's still a
$2 billion company under that

1184
01:04:36,920 --> 01:04:40,040
minimal relatively inside
ownership in the business.

1185
01:04:40,040 --> 01:04:44,160
So yeah, this one really stands
out, this deal to me because it

1186
01:04:44,160 --> 01:04:46,760
wasn't the commodity price that
completely cooked him, right?

1187
01:04:47,000 --> 01:04:53,080
This was this was a bad buy.
They'd possibly still just be

1188
01:04:53,080 --> 01:04:56,560
operating Gualia just like
Genesis are.

1189
01:04:56,840 --> 01:05:00,360
Like they'll know they got the
Bardock assets and everything as

1190
01:05:00,360 --> 01:05:02,880
well.
But like they they simplified

1191
01:05:02,880 --> 01:05:06,840
the business, they're producing
cash and that all body continues

1192
01:05:06,840 --> 01:05:10,080
to the Never Neverland.
Yeah, it's obviously gets more

1193
01:05:10,080 --> 01:05:13,960
difficult at depth, but they
would have, yeah, they would

1194
01:05:13,960 --> 01:05:18,000
have just not been lost all
their assets eventually or had

1195
01:05:18,000 --> 01:05:20,920
to sell all their assets.
It, it makes me think of people

1196
01:05:20,920 --> 01:05:26,440
saying expression, saying no is
like the hardest, but one of the

1197
01:05:26,440 --> 01:05:27,640
most important things you do,
right?

1198
01:05:27,840 --> 01:05:29,880
It's what you say no to that
really matters because

1199
01:05:30,280 --> 01:05:35,600
opportunity cost is enormous.
Yeah, I haven't scrolled to #1.

1200
01:05:35,600 --> 01:05:38,560
Have a guess.
Jase, I don't know.

1201
01:05:38,800 --> 01:05:43,520
Could I review Rio Tinto buys
Alcan this is.

1202
01:05:43,680 --> 01:05:46,680
Yeah, I thought that was going
to mentioned before, but I

1203
01:05:46,680 --> 01:05:48,320
didn't know if you'd mentioned
it to give it away.

1204
01:05:49,360 --> 01:05:53,680
This is perhaps undoubtedly the
most infamous deal in mining

1205
01:05:53,680 --> 01:05:56,880
history and it's the kind of
archetype of top of the cycle

1206
01:05:56,880 --> 01:06:01,600
deal making paying too much at
completely the wrong time.

1207
01:06:01,600 --> 01:06:05,000
And all these dollar sums are
going to be in U.S. dollars that

1208
01:06:05,000 --> 01:06:07,440
I mentioned here.
So factor that in.

1209
01:06:07,520 --> 01:06:10,040
They're they're big, big dollar
sums.

1210
01:06:11,120 --> 01:06:14,680
What was the context here mate?
Mate, the context is the glory

1211
01:06:14,680 --> 01:06:17,200
days.
This is early China boom in the

1212
01:06:17,200 --> 01:06:21,480
first half of 2007.
Alcan, Canadian aluminium giant,

1213
01:06:22,040 --> 01:06:26,760
they're fending off M&A.
The coffers of companies like

1214
01:06:26,960 --> 01:06:29,640
Rio Tinto and all the other
majors are just filling up

1215
01:06:29,640 --> 01:06:31,480
because of everything going on
in China.

1216
01:06:31,480 --> 01:06:36,240
So they've got plenty of cash
coming in the door and commodity

1217
01:06:36,240 --> 01:06:39,880
prices are just higher forever,
as they, as they like to say

1218
01:06:39,880 --> 01:06:42,600
back in the day, stretch.
The chart up into the right and

1219
01:06:42,600 --> 01:06:43,760
that's how you project the
future.

1220
01:06:43,760 --> 01:06:46,080
We all know that's how you you
make decision making.

1221
01:06:46,320 --> 01:06:48,160
Absolutely.
And like you asked before Trav,

1222
01:06:48,720 --> 01:06:51,840
the the framing for this deal
was China needs three things.

1223
01:06:51,840 --> 01:06:54,360
It needs aluminium, copper and
it needs iron ore.

1224
01:06:54,360 --> 01:06:57,000
And we Rio Tinto are going to
service all those needs.

1225
01:06:57,360 --> 01:06:59,760
So that was the mindset they
came into.

1226
01:06:59,760 --> 01:07:01,600
And especially on the alley
side, they wanted to be

1227
01:07:01,600 --> 01:07:04,680
vertically integrated oxide,
alumina, aluminium.

1228
01:07:04,680 --> 01:07:07,640
I wanted to do it all.
And they weren't the only ones

1229
01:07:07,640 --> 01:07:10,800
thinking this way.
So Alcan reached all time highs

1230
01:07:10,840 --> 01:07:15,480
of 61 bucks a share in May of
2007 and then you got Alcoa that

1231
01:07:15,640 --> 01:07:20,920
come in and have a big swing 73
bucks so that the stock at Alcan

1232
01:07:20,920 --> 01:07:23,360
appealed off a little bit.
So this was a 30 bit, 30 odd

1233
01:07:23,360 --> 01:07:24,840
percent premium when they came
in.

1234
01:07:25,320 --> 01:07:26,960
Well, Alcoa bidding cash or a
script?

1235
01:07:28,080 --> 01:07:29,160
Couldn't tell you off the top of
my head.

1236
01:07:30,120 --> 01:07:36,280
Needless to say a a bit of a
bidding war ensues because Alcan

1237
01:07:36,280 --> 01:07:38,480
come out looking for a what not
they want someone else to take

1238
01:07:38,480 --> 01:07:43,440
him out and valet and Rio Tinto
lockhorns and they they go to

1239
01:07:43,440 --> 01:07:45,680
war over this one.
And I just want to make a side

1240
01:07:45,680 --> 01:07:46,880
note.
Some of the charts from the late

1241
01:07:46,880 --> 01:07:50,480
2000s are just fantastic.
Like I'm not sure if it's

1242
01:07:50,680 --> 01:07:53,840
Microsoft paint or just
PowerPoint back in the day, but

1243
01:07:53,840 --> 01:07:55,840
that one with Shanghai in the
background is one of my

1244
01:07:55,840 --> 01:07:58,000
favourites.
The. 3D charts, yeah.

1245
01:07:58,000 --> 01:08:01,280
Oh mate, sick right?
Bring them back.

1246
01:08:01,320 --> 01:08:05,880
Yeah.
So the deal itself in July of

1247
01:08:05,880 --> 01:08:13,000
2007, Rio make a cash offer of
US $101.00 a share that values

1248
01:08:13,040 --> 01:08:19,880
Alcan's equity at US $38.1
billion and this would create

1249
01:08:19,880 --> 01:08:25,319
Rio Tinto Alcan.
This was over a 65% premium to

1250
01:08:25,359 --> 01:08:28,200
Alcan's all time high two months
earlier.

1251
01:08:28,680 --> 01:08:29,840
So.
Understood.

1252
01:08:29,840 --> 01:08:35,800
Price, Yeah.
Yes, yeah, CVRD, which is Valet

1253
01:08:36,399 --> 01:08:40,960
and Rio had kind of got in the
room together and Rio ended up

1254
01:08:40,960 --> 01:08:43,279
in, you know, very kind of
sarcastic quotation marks

1255
01:08:43,279 --> 01:08:46,920
winning out in this one and
getting the right to buy Alcan.

1256
01:08:47,439 --> 01:08:50,560
It gets bigger.
That $38 billion was the equity

1257
01:08:50,560 --> 01:08:54,200
value.
They assumed nearly $6 billion

1258
01:08:54,600 --> 01:08:57,240
US in net debt that Alcan had on
the.

1259
01:08:58,080 --> 01:09:03,160
Ouch. 44 billion US dual levy.
Yeah.

1260
01:09:03,160 --> 01:09:06,680
So they're talking up synergies
of 600 million a year.

1261
01:09:06,680 --> 01:09:10,000
They actually raised this within
a few months and they say we can

1262
01:09:10,000 --> 01:09:14,240
actually do US 1.1 billion in
synergies if you you want to put

1263
01:09:14,240 --> 01:09:17,560
any weight to that.
But here's the real kicker.

1264
01:09:17,720 --> 01:09:20,439
The deal is going to be financed
through newly committed bank

1265
01:09:20,439 --> 01:09:22,600
debt.
They put their buyback on hold

1266
01:09:22,600 --> 01:09:26,000
and they sign up AUS $40 billion
acquisition facility.

1267
01:09:26,600 --> 01:09:29,960
Oh my God.
This takes them to a just about

1268
01:09:29,960 --> 01:09:33,880
AUS $46 billion net debt
position.

1269
01:09:34,760 --> 01:09:35,840
I cannot wrap my head around
those.

1270
01:09:35,840 --> 01:09:37,399
You can't.
You can't get access to that

1271
01:09:37,399 --> 01:09:40,319
kind of like debt these days.
Bring it back.

1272
01:09:40,319 --> 01:09:42,080
Yeah, like that.
Like it was just a different

1273
01:09:42,080 --> 01:09:45,960
time where everyone wanted to
give you debt for deals.

1274
01:09:45,960 --> 01:09:48,439
That's so good that credit
crunch soon came.

1275
01:09:49,000 --> 01:09:50,840
Yeah.
So Rio straightaway want to sell

1276
01:09:50,840 --> 01:09:54,240
out this packaging business, but
that doesn't happen because

1277
01:09:54,240 --> 01:09:57,080
things go South very quickly.
They wanted to sell that for

1278
01:09:57,080 --> 01:10:00,360
over $5 billion, but they only
get $2 billion for it a couple

1279
01:10:00,360 --> 01:10:03,800
years later.
The deal would make Rio Tinto

1280
01:10:03,800 --> 01:10:07,600
the top player in aluminium and
bauxite and a sort of pathway to

1281
01:10:07,600 --> 01:10:12,560
being the top player in Lumina.
Just to like, I need to speak

1282
01:10:12,560 --> 01:10:14,440
about that net deposition once
more.

1283
01:10:14,440 --> 01:10:19,600
It goes from like a couple
billion to 46 billion.

1284
01:10:20,240 --> 01:10:23,920
Like this completely changed the
health of the business.

1285
01:10:24,360 --> 01:10:28,560
And yeah, I'll get to how they
frame it in, in a moment, but

1286
01:10:29,320 --> 01:10:31,920
just stuff goes wrong from the
beginning here.

1287
01:10:31,920 --> 01:10:35,440
So like you said, credit was
freely available and then it and

1288
01:10:35,440 --> 01:10:39,240
then it wasn't and it the door
just slammed shut.

1289
01:10:39,240 --> 01:10:41,840
Like this was done in 2007 when
you could get stuff like that

1290
01:10:41,840 --> 01:10:44,080
done.
And Alcan wasn't even a hugely

1291
01:10:44,080 --> 01:10:46,560
profitable business.
Like it's top line earnings were

1292
01:10:46,560 --> 01:10:49,720
pretty comparable with Rio
Tinto, but it didn't have Wai

1293
01:10:49,720 --> 01:10:52,560
and all.
So it's actual profit was, you

1294
01:10:52,560 --> 01:10:57,080
know, 1/5 of what Rios was.
So the fact that they would sign

1295
01:10:57,080 --> 01:10:59,280
up this much debt is mind
blowing.

1296
01:10:59,280 --> 01:11:03,360
Like the profit of Alcan could
barely even meet the interest

1297
01:11:03,360 --> 01:11:05,680
expense they were going to pay
on the deal.

1298
01:11:06,680 --> 01:11:07,880
At the time they signed the
deal.

1299
01:11:07,880 --> 01:11:11,760
Yeah, wow.
It completely, completely mind

1300
01:11:11,760 --> 01:11:14,440
blowing.
See, you must have been, you

1301
01:11:14,440 --> 01:11:18,800
must have been forecasting a
bunch of, yeah, pretty absurd

1302
01:11:18,800 --> 01:11:21,440
assumptions on on Ali Price to
substantiate this.

1303
01:11:21,440 --> 01:11:22,280
Yeah.
So.

1304
01:11:23,160 --> 01:11:29,800
They talk about pro forma 2.8
times net debt to EBITDA, but

1305
01:11:29,800 --> 01:11:33,400
then the price of the commodity
just falls through the floor and

1306
01:11:33,400 --> 01:11:36,400
that ratio kind of blows out.
And they, they frame it well

1307
01:11:36,400 --> 01:11:39,520
because that was the one
covenant that they had.

1308
01:11:39,520 --> 01:11:43,240
It was a net debt to EBITDA
multiple.

1309
01:11:43,240 --> 01:11:46,840
But it, it really, really starts
to, to hurt them.

1310
01:11:46,840 --> 01:11:51,960
And the company came out and
sort of in August 2007 and like

1311
01:11:51,960 --> 01:11:54,360
boasted about their ability to,
to raise debt.

1312
01:11:54,800 --> 01:11:58,320
That just as a bit of a side
note, as a, as a red flag.

1313
01:11:58,320 --> 01:12:02,960
I think to, to keep in mind,
like, you know, people will give

1314
01:12:02,960 --> 01:12:05,560
you debt when credit markets are
open, right?

1315
01:12:05,680 --> 01:12:08,520
And it's your ability.
It's your ability to say no and

1316
01:12:08,520 --> 01:12:11,360
be strong and understand where
you are in the cycle that you

1317
01:12:11,360 --> 01:12:14,520
want to praise, not the ability
just to sign up debt because

1318
01:12:14,520 --> 01:12:17,280
people in the boom times, we'll
give it to you.

1319
01:12:17,280 --> 01:12:19,520
Oh.
My it is so easy to get 50 grand

1320
01:12:19,520 --> 01:12:21,720
to put into CFDS as a personal
loan.

1321
01:12:22,400 --> 01:12:26,720
Bring it back, Maddie.
So the consequences very soon

1322
01:12:26,720 --> 01:12:32,560
after the world turns S Rio got
the financing away and they had

1323
01:12:32,560 --> 01:12:36,320
to issue in June 2008, less than
a year after the deal, $5

1324
01:12:36,320 --> 01:12:41,160
billion in bonds and then they
just start shopping CapEx laying

1325
01:12:41,160 --> 01:12:46,000
off 14,000 people in late 2008,
divesting heaps of assets

1326
01:12:46,320 --> 01:12:51,480
through O eight, O 9 and 2010
end up netting US $11 billion

1327
01:12:51,480 --> 01:12:53,920
from these divestments.
I'm sure they're assets they,

1328
01:12:54,600 --> 01:12:57,080
yeah, wish they could have kept.
Yeah.

1329
01:12:57,080 --> 01:13:00,800
I mean, commodity markets picked
up relatively soon after, but

1330
01:13:00,960 --> 01:13:05,880
gun to your head because the
first repayments of US, about $9

1331
01:13:05,880 --> 01:13:09,920
billion was due two years after
the deal, 2009.

1332
01:13:10,720 --> 01:13:13,320
No one was interested in
refinancing them.

1333
01:13:13,920 --> 01:13:16,480
And the sole covenant like I was
speaking to before was you had

1334
01:13:16,480 --> 01:13:19,920
to stay under 4 time, 4.5 times
net debt to EBITDA.

1335
01:13:21,120 --> 01:13:23,800
So here's where it gets super,
super, super juicy, right?

1336
01:13:24,720 --> 01:13:30,240
Shortly after Rio had bid for
Alcan BHB in the biggest mining

1337
01:13:30,240 --> 01:13:34,640
deal in history came after Rio.
This was $150 billion hostile

1338
01:13:34,640 --> 01:13:38,160
takeover, nothing we'd ever seen
before in the mining industry.

1339
01:13:39,360 --> 01:13:43,360
And this was killed in due
course through 2008 by the debt

1340
01:13:43,360 --> 01:13:47,760
that Rio Tinto had taken on and
plummeting commodity prices.

1341
01:13:47,760 --> 01:13:53,240
So in November 2008, so this is
a couple of months after Lehman

1342
01:13:53,240 --> 01:13:57,040
has failed, Rio announced that
the deal with BHB has been

1343
01:13:57,040 --> 01:14:00,120
killed and Rio stock falls 40%
in a day.

1344
01:14:00,720 --> 01:14:05,400
Holy crap.
In Feb 2009 they announced a

1345
01:14:05,400 --> 01:14:09,560
joint venture and a convertible
bond deal with Chenalco who to

1346
01:14:09,560 --> 01:14:12,560
this day a big shareholders in
in Rio Tinto and they get a

1347
01:14:12,560 --> 01:14:14,840
regular mention in investor
meetings.

1348
01:14:15,400 --> 01:14:20,080
So they come in and sign this
deal to net them US $19.5

1349
01:14:20,080 --> 01:14:23,320
billion.
But it's not done.

1350
01:14:23,800 --> 01:14:27,120
Ferb did not like this deal.
So give it a few months and

1351
01:14:27,120 --> 01:14:31,680
markets start to improve.
And on June 5, 2009, Rio Tinto

1352
01:14:31,680 --> 01:14:35,320
comes out and says all on the
same day that deal is off with

1353
01:14:35,320 --> 01:14:39,000
Chenalco.
We are now pursuing A-15 US

1354
01:14:39,000 --> 01:14:44,160
billion dollar rights issue.
Rio Tinto, this is after a 65%

1355
01:14:44,160 --> 01:14:49,200
drop in its stock and we're
going to team up with BHB in WA

1356
01:14:49,480 --> 01:14:53,000
iron ore and create this joint
venture that's going to have an

1357
01:14:53,000 --> 01:14:55,400
NPV on the synergies of US 10
billion.

1358
01:14:55,400 --> 01:14:59,480
Dollars.
Wow, OK competition though mate.

1359
01:15:00,000 --> 01:15:02,040
Yeah.
So very unfortunately, the

1360
01:15:02,040 --> 01:15:03,960
regulator didn't like this one
either.

1361
01:15:04,160 --> 01:15:07,120
And that deal, not the rights
issue, the rights issue gets

1362
01:15:07,120 --> 01:15:10,000
away, that gets done, sort of
fixes the balance sheet to an

1363
01:15:10,000 --> 01:15:14,880
extent at Rio, But October 2010
takes a long time for that deal

1364
01:15:14,880 --> 01:15:19,800
to kind of fall over with BHB.
So what could have been?

1365
01:15:19,840 --> 01:15:22,280
So they, they, they did
enormously dilute existing

1366
01:15:22,280 --> 01:15:25,840
shareholders to, to pay out this
debt to the tune of 15 odd

1367
01:15:25,960 --> 01:15:28,160
billion dollars at a depressed
share price.

1368
01:15:29,160 --> 01:15:29,560
Yep.
Ouch.

1369
01:15:29,920 --> 01:15:32,320
Yeah.
And I remember when we talked to

1370
01:15:33,760 --> 01:15:36,680
to Alan Clark, he raised the
potential that, you know, maybe

1371
01:15:36,680 --> 01:15:40,600
the reason Rio paid so much and
in cash and debt funded was

1372
01:15:40,600 --> 01:15:44,280
actually a bit of a poison pill
to prevent being gubbled up by

1373
01:15:44,280 --> 01:15:46,880
BHP themselves.
Yeah, poison pill's a funny

1374
01:15:46,880 --> 01:15:47,800
word, right?
Like, yeah.

1375
01:15:47,960 --> 01:15:50,960
It's like I'm going to, I'm
going to encumbent my business.

1376
01:15:52,200 --> 01:15:54,080
I'm going to kill myself so they
don't date me.

1377
01:15:54,120 --> 01:15:55,880
But maybe I, Yeah.
Yeah.

1378
01:15:56,480 --> 01:15:59,560
Yeah.
Well, is there any more on that

1379
01:15:59,560 --> 01:16:00,720
one, JD or?
Yeah.

1380
01:16:00,720 --> 01:16:03,280
Yeah, I mean a couple of bits
of, you know, in the.

1381
01:16:03,280 --> 01:16:06,040
Since it's #1.
In the in the aftermath have

1382
01:16:06,040 --> 01:16:12,000
taken on all that debt, you
know, the Alcan business itself

1383
01:16:12,000 --> 01:16:15,040
just just didn't do well.
Like there were massive write

1384
01:16:15,040 --> 01:16:19,800
downs, you know, as you'd expect
about 25 billion US in in the

1385
01:16:19,800 --> 01:16:23,880
write downs is the rough number
that you can sort of read into

1386
01:16:23,880 --> 01:16:30,360
on a $38 billion deal then.
And of course the the CEO leaves

1387
01:16:30,360 --> 01:16:33,880
in in 2013.
That was the same announcement

1388
01:16:33,880 --> 01:16:36,800
with these write downs that the
Riversdale write downs happened.

1389
01:16:36,960 --> 01:16:40,640
So all came out on a day that
they announced, I think I want

1390
01:16:40,640 --> 01:16:42,520
to say $14 billion in write
downs.

1391
01:16:42,880 --> 01:16:46,800
So it was a bad day.
Rio went from a market cap of

1392
01:16:46,800 --> 01:16:51,560
about Aussie 150 billion at the
end of two 2007 down to 40

1393
01:16:51,560 --> 01:16:55,440
billion at the end of 2008.
So there there moves you don't

1394
01:16:55,440 --> 01:17:00,120
kind of see every day and yeah,
just that net debt.

1395
01:17:00,120 --> 01:17:03,720
I think that's the the lesson to
kind of hit home and how you

1396
01:17:03,880 --> 01:17:05,560
sort of think about managing
that.

1397
01:17:05,560 --> 01:17:08,320
I mean it was relatively short
dated debt as well.

1398
01:17:08,320 --> 01:17:13,440
Like I said, 1/4 of it had to be
repaid or refinanced within two

1399
01:17:13,440 --> 01:17:17,200
years.
So I mean they did that at a

1400
01:17:17,200 --> 01:17:20,880
time when aluminium had just hit
a 20 year high in price and they

1401
01:17:20,880 --> 01:17:24,600
never foresaw China entering the
aluminium market the way they

1402
01:17:24,600 --> 01:17:26,600
did the.
China.

1403
01:17:26,600 --> 01:17:29,520
China went massive there.
Yeah, absolutely massive.

1404
01:17:29,640 --> 01:17:32,280
Yeah.
The opportunity cost of that

1405
01:17:32,280 --> 01:17:37,920
deal is kind of like it's, it's
very, very big to say the first.

1406
01:17:37,920 --> 01:17:41,320
God, what a time for when was
the I don't know if this was

1407
01:17:41,320 --> 01:17:43,120
around the sun.
Do I remember the stern who

1408
01:17:43,120 --> 01:17:46,280
thing for Rayo?
That's was it.

1409
01:17:46,280 --> 01:17:48,480
The bloody?
That was Rayo, wasn't it?

1410
01:17:48,800 --> 01:17:50,560
I'm not sure what that one was.
There was.

1411
01:17:50,680 --> 01:17:55,280
It was like a there were spying
or something.

1412
01:17:55,400 --> 01:17:59,240
China spy with Rio Tinto I.
Don't know my alley.

1413
01:17:59,600 --> 01:18:01,960
Don't know if it was around the
actual same time, it just

1414
01:18:01,960 --> 01:18:05,080
sounded like a horrible friggin
time for Rio.

1415
01:18:05,080 --> 01:18:08,920
Yeah, Also in that China bit,
there was a lot of very

1416
01:18:08,920 --> 01:18:13,720
uncomplimentary articles about
Rio Tinto written in China.

1417
01:18:14,360 --> 01:18:19,840
When they gave Chinako the flick
on on that June day in 2009,

1418
01:18:19,840 --> 01:18:21,400
there was some funny articles.
Yeah.

1419
01:18:21,400 --> 01:18:28,920
Well, this is It was 2009.
He was a Rio executive pleading

1420
01:18:28,920 --> 01:18:31,960
guilty to stealing commercial
secrets and receiving bribes.

1421
01:18:33,320 --> 01:18:36,920
That was all around the size.
Not a good, not a good period

1422
01:18:36,920 --> 01:18:39,840
for Rio.
But you know tough times make

1423
01:18:39,840 --> 01:18:43,880
you tougher, right?
Eddie, so sensational.

1424
01:18:43,880 --> 01:18:47,560
JD, take a breath.
Need one.

1425
01:18:48,480 --> 01:18:52,000
What are any What's the honor?
What would you say, the honor

1426
01:18:52,000 --> 01:18:54,240
board or the?
Special mentions or something

1427
01:18:54,240 --> 01:18:57,000
like that or mentions.
Oh, there's a couple nickel

1428
01:18:57,000 --> 01:18:59,760
deals that were done in recent
times that are probably worthy

1429
01:18:59,760 --> 01:19:01,840
of a mention.
I think there's there's a few

1430
01:19:01,840 --> 01:19:04,320
that the ones that really.
Jubilee would have been up

1431
01:19:04,320 --> 01:19:05,240
there, wouldn't it?
Yeah.

1432
01:19:05,240 --> 01:19:08,520
So the ones that really caught
my interest were international

1433
01:19:08,520 --> 01:19:12,520
deals.
So that Jubilee obviously with

1434
01:19:12,520 --> 01:19:16,320
Extrada coming in, there was a
few other really interesting

1435
01:19:16,320 --> 01:19:21,080
ones, the gold ones at the time
blanking on some of the names,

1436
01:19:21,080 --> 01:19:23,280
but there was are.
There were scenarios.

1437
01:19:23,760 --> 01:19:25,520
Yeah, they are, they are the
nickel ones.

1438
01:19:25,640 --> 01:19:29,880
Yeah, absolutely.
There's, there's more than a few

1439
01:19:29,880 --> 01:19:34,040
out there that are worthy of a
mention, but I think we can

1440
01:19:34,040 --> 01:19:35,840
leave it at 5.
I think there's a lot of lessons

1441
01:19:35,840 --> 01:19:38,200
to sort of sink in from, from
those ones that the ones I'm

1442
01:19:38,200 --> 01:19:42,440
kind of thinking of front and
center, Maddie, is like just how

1443
01:19:42,440 --> 01:19:44,320
quickly commodity markets can
change.

1444
01:19:44,720 --> 01:19:48,480
They can change so much quicker
than you can possibly imagine.

1445
01:19:48,480 --> 01:19:53,560
And added to that, like the, the
power of allocating your capital

1446
01:19:53,560 --> 01:19:57,080
when you have a best in class
asset is is super important.

1447
01:19:57,240 --> 01:19:59,800
That ties in with what I said
about saying no to deals because

1448
01:19:59,880 --> 01:20:01,240
that's what Rio Tinto had,
right?

1449
01:20:01,240 --> 01:20:05,720
And you see so many shiny things
flying by that the power of

1450
01:20:05,720 --> 01:20:08,840
saying no and holding on is, is
super, super important.

1451
01:20:08,840 --> 01:20:12,720
And Trev, you mentioned this
earlier, but looking at the

1452
01:20:12,720 --> 01:20:15,960
percentage ownerships of
management on the buying side

1453
01:20:15,960 --> 01:20:18,640
versus the selling side is a
very interesting one.

1454
01:20:19,280 --> 01:20:23,800
So often the sellers, Needless
to say, had big stakes and they

1455
01:20:23,800 --> 01:20:25,280
thought it was the right time to
say goodbye.

1456
01:20:25,960 --> 01:20:28,080
And these were kind of
professional management teams on

1457
01:20:28,080 --> 01:20:29,960
the buying side, so.
Yeah.

1458
01:20:30,160 --> 01:20:32,600
Who plays a role?
Whose incentive structure might

1459
01:20:33,160 --> 01:20:36,880
be bigger is more, Yeah, at
times, yeah.

1460
01:20:36,880 --> 01:20:39,440
What other takeaways are there?
I mean, I've noticed a couple of

1461
01:20:39,440 --> 01:20:46,400
themes in in these top five,
including the punitive cost of

1462
01:20:46,760 --> 01:20:50,320
debt when you get the cycle
wrong and the the deal wrong.

1463
01:20:50,480 --> 01:20:53,560
Yeah, 100%.
Like debt can be a killer and

1464
01:20:53,560 --> 01:20:56,640
it's always, always
underestimated.

1465
01:20:56,640 --> 01:21:00,560
Like just yeah, just listen to
Warren Buffett and Charlie

1466
01:21:00,560 --> 01:21:01,760
Munger and how they speak about
it.

1467
01:21:01,880 --> 01:21:05,000
You want more justice than I.
It's those one in 100 year

1468
01:21:05,000 --> 01:21:06,960
events that you're trying to
avoid.

1469
01:21:07,240 --> 01:21:10,920
But to to think your downside is
limited to to what you're paying

1470
01:21:11,320 --> 01:21:14,200
is wrong.
The downside is can be way more

1471
01:21:14,200 --> 01:21:17,720
than just the price tag like
whether that you know, firstly

1472
01:21:17,720 --> 01:21:20,360
opportunity cost first and
foremost, but then also the debt

1473
01:21:20,360 --> 01:21:23,280
you're taking on and all these
other things that the

1474
01:21:23,280 --> 01:21:27,440
liabilities in some of these
cases it, it is not limited to

1475
01:21:27,440 --> 01:21:29,760
what you're spending.
And sometimes you think, Oh

1476
01:21:29,760 --> 01:21:32,240
well, it's, you know, my market
cap today.

1477
01:21:32,240 --> 01:21:36,080
I, I can easily raise that
amount in equity if I needed to,

1478
01:21:36,080 --> 01:21:38,520
to, to fund the repayment of
that debt if it all goes

1479
01:21:39,000 --> 01:21:40,520
haywire.
But you don't think that share

1480
01:21:40,520 --> 01:21:42,640
price is going to be 80% lower
as a result as well.

1481
01:21:42,640 --> 01:21:45,920
So your dilution is horrible.
Yeah.

1482
01:21:45,920 --> 01:21:47,160
It's not there when you kind of
need it.

1483
01:21:47,360 --> 01:21:51,680
And yeah, that's just like
really, really, really do your

1484
01:21:51,680 --> 01:21:56,640
DD and listen to to every
technical financial person you

1485
01:21:56,640 --> 01:22:00,840
possibly can because you can end
up paying a a big price.

1486
01:22:00,920 --> 01:22:05,240
Another theme I noticed was a, a
propensity to seek growth

1487
01:22:06,240 --> 01:22:10,600
internationally where maybe your
like core expertise might not be

1488
01:22:10,600 --> 01:22:15,040
or this like, yeah, I call it a
dubious rationale to do a deal

1489
01:22:15,040 --> 01:22:18,440
is diversification of of
earnings into a bit of a

1490
01:22:18,440 --> 01:22:20,240
different commodity or a
different jurisdiction.

1491
01:22:20,240 --> 01:22:23,080
But that in mining, like there's
no synergies there.

1492
01:22:23,360 --> 01:22:25,920
Yeah, it looks like they all
went into unfamiliar

1493
01:22:25,920 --> 01:22:28,960
jurisdictions to themselves.
Yeah, most of them.

1494
01:22:29,320 --> 01:22:32,080
And just capturing more upside
because the commodity price is

1495
01:22:32,080 --> 01:22:35,000
rising, it's not not a good
enough right now.

1496
01:22:35,560 --> 01:22:37,280
It's like Nah, that doesn't
work.

1497
01:22:38,040 --> 01:22:40,160
I should probably add in that
I'm sure I've got details wrong

1498
01:22:40,160 --> 01:22:42,400
in here, so feel free to to get
in touch.

1499
01:22:42,440 --> 01:22:44,200
Money miners keen to keen to
hear.

1500
01:22:44,200 --> 01:22:47,040
I'm sure there's other people
with vastly more experience than

1501
01:22:47,040 --> 01:22:50,160
I who know of other super
interesting deals out there, So

1502
01:22:50,160 --> 01:22:52,440
very, very keen to hear those
ones too.

1503
01:22:52,440 --> 01:22:53,800
But.
Let us know the deals that you

1504
01:22:53,800 --> 01:22:55,720
think of when you think of value
distraction, yeah.

1505
01:22:56,000 --> 01:22:58,400
Be good to do like a.
You could do a smaller end one

1506
01:22:59,000 --> 01:23:03,480
like you know, smaller deals
that ruin small to medium

1507
01:23:03,480 --> 01:23:05,920
companies as well.
Yeah, I think projects would be

1508
01:23:05,920 --> 01:23:07,240
interesting as well.
There'll be a lot of like

1509
01:23:07,480 --> 01:23:11,800
technical learnings on that
side, so maybe someone more well

1510
01:23:11,800 --> 01:23:13,200
versed in that field would be
interesting.

1511
01:23:13,200 --> 01:23:16,360
And of course, the five best
deals would be an interesting

1512
01:23:16,360 --> 01:23:20,720
one.
They're like or the five, the

1513
01:23:21,160 --> 01:23:22,880
five.
Just a person, a lot.

1514
01:23:23,040 --> 01:23:26,840
Of sales are the five best
buyers 105 worst buys?

1515
01:23:26,840 --> 01:23:29,360
Are the five best sells?
That's it.

1516
01:23:29,560 --> 01:23:30,680
Alright, I think we should leave
it there.

1517
01:23:30,800 --> 01:23:34,360
How long did it take you to
gather or how long you been on

1518
01:23:34,360 --> 01:23:38,800
this project for Jodie?
I started last year, but there

1519
01:23:38,800 --> 01:23:40,640
was a there was a big hiatus in
between.

1520
01:23:40,640 --> 01:23:42,200
But yeah, it was just sort of
out of interest.

1521
01:23:42,200 --> 01:23:44,320
Then I thought, oh, maybe we can
turn this into an episode or

1522
01:23:44,320 --> 01:23:46,000
something.
Mate, it's like writing a book.

1523
01:23:47,760 --> 01:23:50,120
'Cause it was the longest sort
of write up since my uni days, I

1524
01:23:50,120 --> 01:23:52,280
reckon.
Yeah, it's good fun.

1525
01:23:52,400 --> 01:23:54,440
It's very interesting.
Right now we better thank all

1526
01:23:54,440 --> 01:23:55,880
the partners.
I don't know if I'm in a

1527
01:23:55,880 --> 01:23:58,480
different shirt or something
'cause this may be recorded

1528
01:23:58,520 --> 01:24:04,200
later, but if I am, whatever.
Say discounted tickets going out

1529
01:24:04,200 --> 01:24:06,720
the bloody door everywhere.
Oz IMM underground operators

1530
01:24:06,720 --> 01:24:09,960
conference conference 100 bucks
off but you got discounts on the

1531
01:24:09,960 --> 01:24:12,720
GRX conference in Brizzy in May
buddy.

1532
01:24:12,920 --> 01:24:16,000
Oh, but it's just all happening.
And our great partners at

1533
01:24:16,000 --> 01:24:18,640
Mineral Mining Services,
Grounded, Sandy Ground Sport,

1534
01:24:18,960 --> 01:24:23,680
CRO Insurance, K Drill, WA Water
Balls, Swig, Quattro, Project

1535
01:24:23,680 --> 01:24:27,320
Engineering, Cross Boundary
Energy, JD Sensational.

1536
01:24:28,160 --> 01:24:29,040
Thanks mate.
Hurduru.

1537
01:24:29,040 --> 01:24:30,000
Money miners.
Hurduru.

1538
01:24:30,880 --> 01:24:33,520
Information contained in this
episode of Money of Mine is of

1539
01:24:33,520 --> 01:24:35,600
general nature only and does not
take into account the

1540
01:24:35,600 --> 01:24:39,200
objectives, financial situation
or needs of any particular

1541
01:24:39,200 --> 01:24:41,240
person.
Before making any investment

1542
01:24:41,240 --> 01:24:44,280
decision, you should consult
with your financial advisor and

1543
01:24:44,280 --> 01:24:47,440
consider how appropriate the
advice is to your objectives,

1544
01:24:47,640 --> 01:24:49,640
financial situation and needs.